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Since the June evening twenty-four years ago when the government
of the United States "rang down the curtain"' on the lives of Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg,2 their case has posed perplexing difficulties for
those concerned with the American judicial system and its response
in times of political stress. 3 Coming in the middle of the Korean War
and less than two years after the Soviet Union unexpectedly exploded
its first atomic device, the Rosenbergs' trial for conspiracy to commit
atomic espionage raised, in sharpest form, the type of emotional issues
most likely to distort the judicial process. In time, perhaps, questions
of the defendants' guilt or innocence, and other factual issues still
the subject of bitter dispute, may assume a predominantly historical
importance. Yet the fundamental problems of the case, as an ex-
emplar of judicial process in a time of extraordinary stress, will
continue to demand critical scrutiny. Of the numerous problems of
judicial process raised by the Rosenberg case, there is one of con-
tinuing importance that has eluded cogent treatment.
t Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
I. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting
from vacation of stay of execution).
2. The principal opinions in United States v. Rosenberg are reported at 195 F.2d 583
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952) (affirming judgment of conviction); 108 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953)
(denial of petition for order to vacate and set aside convictions and sentences); 346 U.S.
273 (1953) (vacating stay of execution).
3. The problems of the Rosenberg case have evoked an extensive literature. Legal
aspects of the case prompted early law review commentary: Note, The Rosenberg Case:
Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 219 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Columbia Note]. Among other discussions that appeared in the years immediately
following the trial were: S. FINEBE R, THE ROSENBERG CASE (1953); 0. PILAT, THE AToM
SPIES (1952); V. REUBEN, THE ATOM Spy HOAX (1955); M. SHARP, WAS JUSTICE DONE?
(1956); J. WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG (1953); Mann, Book
Review, 67 YALE L.J. 528 (1958).
The publication of W. & M. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST (1965) stimulated re-
newed interest in the Rosenberg case. See Bickel, Book Review, COMFENTARY, Jan. 1966,
at 69; Boudin, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 254 (1966); Pitofsky, Book Review, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 608 (1966). More recent discussions include L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY
(1973) and memoirs by the Rosenbergs' sons, R. & M. MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONs
(1975), and by Morton Sobell, a co-defendant, M. SOBELL, ON DOING TIME (1974).
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At the Rosenbergs' trial the Government introduced evidence that
the defendants were members of the Communist Party of the United
States and that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had expressed a "pref-
erence" for the Soviet form of government over that of the United
States. Many of the statements and associations of the Rosenbergs,
so introduced into evidence, clearly represent speech and association
protected by the First Amendment. It is reasonable, therefore, that
First Amendment doctrine should be considered in determining wheth-
er such evidence should be admitted. Yet the bearing of the First
Amendment on the admissibility of evidence of unpopular political
speech or association to prove a nonspeech offense has received
little attention.
4
4. First Amendment limitations on the introduction of evidence are discussed, in
general terms, in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 405-07 (1970), and,
with respect to conspiracy prosecutions, in Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment,
79 YALE L.J. 872, 894-95 (1970). For discussion of evidentiary problems in the Rosenberg
case, without mention of the First Amendment, see Columbia Note, supra note 3, at
223-28; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 613-14.
'The introduction of evidence of speech and association in the Rosenberg case was by
no means unique. In celebrated murder trials in Pennsylvania in the 1870s, evidence was
introduced to show that the defendants were members of a secret organization (the
"Molly Maguires") that numbered murder of political opponents among its purposes, in
addition to more general political agitation. See Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 139,
155-56 (1877); Carroll v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 107, 124-25 (1877). Similarly, in the trial
of anarchists for conspiring to commit the famous Haymarket bombing, voluminous
evidence of their political views and associations was entered into evidence. Spies v.
People, 122 Ill. 1, 119-27, 12 N.E. 865, 923-27 (1887).
Another well-known historical instance occurred in the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. In
that case the prosecution argued that the defendants' suspicious actions at the time of
their arrest showed "consciousness of guilt" of murder. The defendants responded that
their actions actually reflected fear of mistreatment and deportation, the fate of many
radicals during the notorious Palmer Raids then in progress. Under the pretext of
determining whether defendants were in fact radicals, as they claimed to be, the prosecu-
tion subjected defendants to sustained and inflammatory cross-examination concerning
their political views and associations. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND
VANZETrI 35-62 (1927). On appeal the cross-examination was found not to have been im-
proper, particularly in light of the trial court's instruction to the jury that the " 'radical
as well as the conservative'" is entitled to equal treatment under the law. Common-
wealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 439, 151 N.E. 839, 856 (1926). For similar cases arising in
this period, see Maki v. United States, 12 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1926) (considering introduc-
tion of evidence suggesting that defendants were members of Industrial Workers of the
World) and People v. Tanner, 36 Cal. App. 20, 171 P. 439 (1918) (same).
During and immediately after World War II evidence of the pro-Nazi views and
associations of defendants was introduced in prosecutions for conspiracy to commit
espionage, United States v. Molzahn, 135 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774
(1943), and for treason, United States v. Haupt, 152 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 330
U.S. 631 (1947). In the Cold War period, evidence of defendants' Communist Party
membership was introduced in cases involving conspiracy to obstruct justice, United
States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1951); see J. WVEXLEY, supra note 3, at 218-19,
and perjury, United States v. Perl, 210 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1954). In another case of
the period, evidence of Communist Party affiliations was introduced in prosecutions in-
volving picket-line violence, Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 79, 85 A.2d 425, 428
(1951) (reversing conviction for affray because evidence of Communist activity inadmis-
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Since the Rosenberg case presents the First Amendment problems
in an elaborate and suggestive form, an analysis of the evidentiary
rulings in that case provides a convenient focus for a broader dis-
cussion of the underlying constitutional issues. Consequently, Part I
of this article will examine the operation of the traditional evidentiary
test in United States v. Rosenberg. Part II will then argue that the
First Amendment requires a more stringent exclusion of evidence of
the defendant's protected speech and association than is presently af-
forded by prevailing evidentiary standards. Finally, Part III will pro-
pose a First Amendment test for the exclusion of evidence and will
conclude with suggestions about the application of that test to spec-
ified classes of evidence. 5
I. Evidence of Speech and Association in
United States v. Rosenberg
In March, 1951, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were tried for con-
spiring with others to deliver military secrets of the United States to
the Soviet Union.0 Morton Sobell was indicted as a co-conspirator.
sible). In United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962),
a prosecution for conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, the
defendant's membership in the "Trotskyite wing of the German Communist Party in
1919" was held properly admitted as "relevant background .. . to show the motivation
and community of interest of the conspirators." Id. at 240.
Similar issues were raised in well-known prosecutions in the 1960s. In the trial of the
so-called Panther 21 for conspiracy to bomb department stores in New York City, the
film The Battle of Algiers was entered into evidence and shown to the jury in its en-
tirety after a prosecution witness testified that a leader of the alleged conspiracy ordered
other members to emulate the methods of terror depicted in the film. See M. KE.MPTON,
THE BRIAR PATCH 162, 199, 213, 271-72 (1973); P. ZIMROTH, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE 159-60
(1974). In the trial of Angela Davis for alleged participation in planning a courthouse
escape, the prosecution introduced volumes, said to belong to Davis, that contained
academic studies of violence. A. DAVIs, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 359 (1974); see also Barker,
Evidence: Did Angela Davis Testify?, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 1, 20 (1972). The defendants in
both cases were acquitted by the jury. Further, in a prosecution for conspiracy to
bomb the statue of Liberty and commit other crimes, the Government introduced
evidence indicating that defendants were connected with the Black Liberation Front
and Canadian separatist groups and that one defendant had traveled to Cuba where
he was associated with Che Guevara. United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1, 14 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 961 (1966).
5. Evidence of a defendant's political speech is often admitted into evidence to prove
offenses that themselves punish speech of a particular content, such as sedition or incite-
ment to violence. The focus of this article, however, is not on these prosecutions, in
which the chief issue is the constitutionality of punishing particular speech itself, but
rather on the permissibility of introducing evidence of protected speech in the course of
proving a nonspeech offense of undoubted constitutional validity.
6. The Rosenbergs were charged with conspiracy to violate § 2(a) of the Espionage
Act of 1917, then codified as 50 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1946), which provided:
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or
transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or
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The Government contended that Julius Rosenberg, as the key figure
in a Soviet espionage ring, had secured highly secret information,
including sketches of the atomic bomb, and then transmitted that
information to the Soviet Union. All three defendants were found
guilty, and the Rosenbergs were sentenced to death. After a vigorous
legal struggle7 and the rejection of petitions for executive clemency,
the Rosenbergs were executed on June 19, 1953. Sobell was sentenced
to thirty years in prison and remained incarcerated until January,
1969.
A. Possible Uses of Evidence in Rosenberg
From the initial stages of the Rosenbergs' trial-the questioning
of prospective jurors on voir dire and the Government's opening
statement-it was clear that the prosecution intended to introduce
substantial evidence bearing on the political views and Communist
Party membership and activities of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.8 This
strategy was bitterly opposed from the outset by defense counsel, ul-
timately without success. As introduced, the disputed evidence took
two forms: (1) evidence that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg held certain
political views-specifically, that they preferred the Soviet form of
government to the form of government of the United States; 9 and
transmit, to any foreign government . . . or to any representative, officer, agent,
employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document,
writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue
print, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the
national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty
years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of this subsection in time
of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty
years ....
The section, as further amended, is now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1970). The related
conspiracy provision is id. § 794(c).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. In his opening statement the prosecutor declared, "[tjhe evidence will show that
the loyalty and the allegiance of the Rosenbergs and Sobell were not to our country,
but that it was to Communism, Communism in this country and Communism through-
out the world." Exhibit to Petition for Certiorari at 180, Rosenberg v. United States, 344
U.S. 838 (1952) (reproducing transcript of trial in Southern District of New York) [here-
inafter cited without cross-reference as Transcript]. The prosecutor further stated that
Sobell and Julius Rosenberg "dedicated themselves to the cause of Communism," id. at
181, and that "love of Communism and the Soviet Union" led them into espionage, id.
at 182. For voir dire questioning of prospective jurors that suggested the relevance of
Communist party membership and affiliation to issues of the case, see id. at 62-79, 93;
see also id. at 119-20.
9. Id. at 414-21, 789-91. See note 41 infra. On cross-examination Julius Rosenberg
further acknowledged that during World War II he believed that the Soviet Union was
making "the major" contribution to the war effort, even after the opening of the second
front, Transcript at 1174. He also acknowledged his belief that the Soviets had made
advances in their way of life, id. at 1079, 1173, 1237-39.
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(2) evidence that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had entered into cer-
tain political associations-specifically, that they were members of
the Communist Party of the United States and were affiliated with
organizations said to be related to the Communist Party.10 Further,
the Government introduced testimony of Elizabeth Bentley, a former
Communist Party member and an "expert" on Party affairs, for the
purpose of "connecting" Party membership with possible espionage
on behalf of the Soviet Union."
Under what theory was this evidence admitted? Possession of the
political views and associations attributed to the defendants did not
in itself constitute a crime-at least not the crime for which the Ro-
senbergs were being tried. Nor did possession of such views or asso-
ciations constitute a distinct element of the offense with which the
defendants had been charged-conspiracy to commit espionage.
Evidence may be admissible, however, if it is relevant to an ele-
ment of the offense, that is, if it makes the existence of that element
more or less probable than it would have been without the evi-
dence. 12 The question of whether the evidence is relevant is thus the
first to be asked in considering its admissibility. Assuming that the
evidence is relevant, and not excluded under a categorical doc-
trine such as the hearsay rule, the second question is whether the
evidence should be excluded because it is unduly prejudicial, mis-
leading, or time-consuming. This second determination requires a
balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the risk of
10. Evidence was introduced to the effect that Julius Rosenberg was dismissed from
government employment because of membership in the Communist Party, Transcript at
241-42, 1182-86, 1303; that the Rosenbergs had actively pursued Communist Party
activities, id. at 679; see also id. at 423-24; that at one time the Rosenbergs were in the
habit of buying the Daily Worker, id. at 424, 679; see also id. at 1237, 1239-40; that
Julius Rosenberg had contributed to and had collected money for the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, id. at 1176-78; and that Ethel Rosenberg had signed a petition for
a Communist Party candidate for city council, id. at 1346-47, 1352; see also id. at 1350.
Julius Rosenberg was also questioned about his connection with the International Workers
Order, which, the prosecutor suggested, was "a Communist organization." Id. at 1178-81.
The Rosenbergs invoked their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination when
asked about membership in the Communist Party. Id. at 1183, 1186, 1277; see also id. at
1309, 1353, 1371.
Further, Max Elitcher, a college classmate of Sobell and Julius Rosenberg, testified
that Sobell had recruited him into the Communist Party, id. at 203-05, 224; that Sobell
had acted as chairman of a Communist Party group in Washington, D.C., id. at 225; that
the group discussed Marxist-Leninist theory and current events reported in the Daily
Worker, id. at 226; that the chairman of the group instructed members to infiltrate other
organizations, id.; and that "we were to go out and to gain support from people around
us for the position of the Soviet Union," id. at 229.
11. For a discussion of this evidence, see pp. 1637-38 infra.
12. See, e.g., James, Revelancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 704
(1941).
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prejudice or other danger posed by its admission. The traditional
view of this balancing process strongly favors the admissibility of evi-
dence, and in some formulations requires that the prejudicial danger
of evidence must "substantially outweigh" its probative value before
it may be excluded. 13 Moreover, the accepted view confides broad
discretion to the trial judge in the process of balancing and con-
templates that appellate review will be sparingly exercised.14
Since a determination of logical relevance is the essential first
step in evidentiary analysis, it is a matter of substantial importance
that in the Rosenberg case the relevance of the defendants' political
views and associations does not emerge with uniform clarity from
the language either of the trial or of the appellate court. It is not
always clear, either in the transcript of the trial or in the opinion
of the appellate court, precisely to which element of the offense the
evidence was thought to be relevant. Further, the trial and appellate
courts do not appear to be in complete agreement with respect to
the nature of the logical relevance of the defendants' political activity.
At the outset of the trial, Judge Kaufman indicated that evidence
of the defendants' political associations would be admissible to show
the defendants' "motive," apparently in order to give rise to a pos-
sible inference that the defendants performed acts of espionage. 15
He then shifted, however, from this rationale to assertions that evi-
dence of political views and associations was admissible to show the
defendants' intent to give advantage to a foreign nation-a distinct
element of the offense with which the Rosenbergs were charged.' 6
13. E.g., Uniform Rule of Evidence 45 (1953 version); FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EviD.
CODE § 352 (West 1966). Cf. MODEL CODE OF EviDE-CE Rule 303 (permitting exclusion of
evidence in discretion of trial judge "if he finds that its probative value is outweighed
[rather than "substantially" outweighed] by the risk that its admission will . . . create
substantial danger of undue prejudice"). Even under such a rule the burden is placed on
the party seeking the exclusion of evidence. See generally Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice
Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976).
14. See Dolan, supra note 13, at 225, 227.
For analyses of the evidence of the Rosenbergs' political views and activities under the
balancing test, see Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 223-28, and Pitofsky, supra note 3,
at 613-14.
15. Responding to an objection to a passage in the prosecutor's opening statement,
Judge Kaufman remarked that if the Government sought to show that an interest in
Communism established a "motive for what they [defendants] were doing," he would
rule on the issue later. Transcript at 181. Judge Kaufman subsequently accepted testimony
on Sobell's Communist Party affiliation, subject to "causal connection . . . purely on the
question of motive and not as proving the charge." Id. at 200 (emphasis added). In the
course of the discussion on this point, Judge Kaufman remarked that "I must accept
the good faith of the prosecutor that he will show a causal connection between Com-
munism and the commission of the acts charged in the indictment." Id. at 199 (emphasis
added). See id. at 200, 201, 202, 215. See also id. at 216-17.
16. See note 30 infra.
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Moreover, while Judge Kaufman ultimately abandoned references
to "motive" in his instructions to the jury, Judge Frank, writing
for the court of appeals, asserted that evidence of political statements
may show a "motive for . . . spying" or an "intent to do so," and
that Communist Party membership may bear on "motive or intent
to aid Russia."' 7 Judge Frank's opinion thus not only suggests im-
portant deviations from Judge Kaufman's ultimate view at trial, but
also introduces substantial ambiguities and confusions of its own.
The ambiguous and apparently conflicting statements of the trial
and appellate courts suggest several possible uses of the evidence in
question. To aid analysis of the views of each court, it will be useful
to separate the various distinct uses of evidence that may be con-
cealed in references to "motive" and "intent" and to consider the
ways in which the disputed evidence may have been relevant to the
offense with which the Rosenbergs were charged.
1. Use of speech or association to show that defendants committed
the acts charged. Evidence is relevant if it increases or decreases the
probability that the criminal acts charged were committed by the
defendants. In United States v. Rosenberg, evidence of the defendants'
political views and associations may have been used in either or both
of two ways to show that the defendants committed the acts charged:' 8
the evidence may have shown (a) motive for committing the acts or
(b) intention to commit the acts.
a. Motive for committing an act. A jury may believe it more like-
ly that an individual performed a certain act if it is shown that he
had a "motive" for performing the act. A motive is a general desire
or other emotion that may lead to the performance of an act.' 9 Mo-
tive may be proved, of course, by an explicit statement by the de-
fendant that he or she possesses the motive in question. Since such
17. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 595, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952).
18. In Rosenberg the acts charged included the act of entering into the conspiratorial
agreement to commit espionage and the specific acts of espionage (e.g., receiving and
transmitting plans of the atomic bomb) performed pursuant to that agreement. Much of
the Government's evidence against the Rosenbergs was intended to prove the commission
of acts such as the solicitation and receipt of defense information, from which the
existence of the agreement could be inferred.
19. See I J. WIGMNORE, EVIDENCE § 117 (3d ed. 1940).
Notice the distinction between motive for committing an act and intention to commit
that act. Motive for performing an act is a more general desire (or other emotion) that
may be gratified by the performance of the act, but may conceivably be gratified in
some other way as well. Intention to perform an act, discussed below, is a more focused
and specific desire or plan to perform the very act in question. Thus, a general desire for
money may be a motive for robbing a store, but such a general state of mind is quite
different from an actual intention to rob the store. See generally Cook, Act, Intention,
and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 658-62 (1917).
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explicit statements are rarely available, however, motive is more fre-
quently shown by circumstantial evidence.20 The circumstantial evi-
dence gives rise to an inference of motive-a state of mind-from
which one can draw the further inference that the person performed
the act for which he had the motive.2 1 Thus it may be asserted that
evidence of the Rosenbergs' membership in the Communist Party or
of their favorable statements about the form of government of the
Soviet Union might give rise to an inference that they possessed a
general desire to further the goals of the Soviet Union. Possession
of such a motive, it could be argued, may have increased the proba-
bility that the Rosenbergs either committed acts of espionage on
behalf of the Soviet Union or entered into a conspiracy to do so.
b. Intention to commit an act. Evidence that an individual pos-
sessed the intention to perform a specific act is relevant for the purpose
of showing that he subsequently acted in accordance with that inten-
tion and proceeded to perform the act.2 2 As in the case of motive,
evidence showing an individual's intention to perform an act is not
restricted to his statement of intention, but may also include evidence
of other statements or acts from which an inference of such inten-
tion can be drawn. It might be argued, for instance, that Communist
Party membership or statements favoring the Soviet form of gov-
ernment gave rise to an inference that the defendants intended to
perform acts of espionage, from which it might then be inferred
that defendants did in fact commit those acts or conspire to do so.23
2. Assuming an act has been proved, use of speech or association
to show the intent of the defendant in performing the act. Evidence is
also relevant if it tends to show that a person possessed a certain state
20. For example, evidence of defendant's large gambling losses might be introduced
to show the defendant's need and hence his desire for money-a possible motive for the
defendant's alleged robbery of a store.
21. The "external fact" giving rise to an inference of motive-e.g., the gambling
losses-is sometimes itself referred to as the "motive," an improper usage that "tends to
obscure the double evidential step involved." 1 J. VIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 117. In
assessing the probative value of the evidence, it is important to realize that at least two
inferences are involved, since either may have vitiating weakness.
22. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 299-300 (1892).
23. Any inference from motive to an act requires an intermediate inference from
motive to the actor's intention to perform the act. Evidence used to show motive often
can be used to show the actor's intention to perform the act as well. Thus with respect
to evidence of the Rosenbergs' political ,iews, the use of evidence to show intention does
not seem to differ significantly from the use of evidence to show motive. Rather, the
two analyses appear to be essentially equivalent techniques for explaining the ultimate
inference from speech to action. In the case of Communist Party membership, however,
it might be argued that "expert" testimony concerning Party discipline, see p. 1637
infra, might be employed more directly to establish intention to commit espionage, from
which the less remote inference from intention to action might conceivably be drawn.
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of mind, which itself constitutes a specific element of the offense. Used
in this sense, a finding of intent is not used to give rise to a further
inference of action, but is itself the thing to be proved.24
a. Intent to perform an act. In order to prove many criminal of-
fenses it is necessary to show both that the defendant performed a
specific act and that the defendant intended to perform that act.
In the Rosenberg case, however, if the defendants did solicit and re-
ceive atomic energy information, as the Government charged, there
was no possibility that such acts were performed accidentally or un-
knowingly. Thus even if the Rosenbergs had been prosecuted for
the substantive offense of espionage, the question of "intent" in this
sense would not have been the subject of specific proof at trial.
b. Intent in conspiracy prosecutions. The Rosenbergs, however,
were not prosecuted for espionage, but rather for conspiracy to com-
mit espionage, and the offense of conspiracy has its own unique re-
quirements of intent. In a conspiracy prosecution the government
must show an intent to conspire, which ordinarily possesses two
separate aspects: the conspirator must (i) intend to act in concert
with other conspirators and (ii) intend, in so acting, to accomplish
a specific end forbidden by statute. -a Thus, in Rosenberg, each de-
fendant must be shown to have intended (i) to act in concert with
others (ii) for the purpose of transferring national defense information
to the Soviet Union. Both aspects of the requisite intent would be
shown by proving the conspiratorial acts attributed to the defendants
by witnesses for the prosecution: soliciting and receiving defense in-
formation for the express purpose of transmitting it to the Soviet
Union.26 Thus if the jury decided that the defendants performed the
24. In considering this type of evidence of intent, it is useful to assume that
performance of the act in question has been proved. The discussion can then focus on
the state of mind of the actor in performing the act.
25. See generally Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624
(1941). In many jurisdictions a criminal conspiracy may be established even if the
specific end sought to be achieved by the conspirators is not independently proscribed
by statute. For a history of conspiracy doctrine focusing on this problem, see Sayre,
Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REv. 393 (1922).
26. According to David and Ruth Greenglass, the brother and sister-in-law of Ethel
Rosenberg and the chief Government witnesses at trial, Julius Rosenberg sought in-
formation relating to the atomic bomb so that it could be given "to the Russians."
Transcript at 424. The Greenglasses testified that Julius and Ethel made extensive
arrangements with them for the procurement of atom bomb information to be transmitted
to the Soviet Union. Id. at 421-29, 438-54, 489-500, 510-13, 679-705. Julius was said to
have introduced David Greenglass to someone whom Julius identified as a "Russian,"
who asked David, a machinist at the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory, for military in-
formation. Id. at 451-54. See also, e.g., id. at 692, 708, 786 (payments from "the Russians");
id. at 710 (plans for escape to Soviet Union).
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acts alleged by the prosecution, intent in this sense would not have
constituted a separate issue with respect to the Rosenbergs.
2 7
c. Intent (or reason to believe) that the information is to be used
to the advantage of a foreign nation. To establish an offense under
§ 2(a) of the Espionage Act of 1917, it is not sufficient to show that
the defendant transmitted national defense information to a foreign
government and that he intended that the information be so trans-
mitted. The government must also prove, as a distinct element of
the offense, that the defendant acted "with intent or reason to be-
lieve that [the information] is to be used . . . to the advantage of
[that] foreign nation."28 Similarly, in a prosecution for conspiracy to
violate § 2(a), the government must show that, in conspiring, the
defendants intended or had "reason to believe" that such transfer
of information would give advantage to the foreign nation. In the
Rosenberg case, then, evidence that the defendants' political views
and associations indicated benevolence toward the Soviet Union may
have been used to show that the defendants-assuming they did agree
to transfer information to the Soviet Union-did so with the intent
to give advantage to the Soviet Union.
B. Judicial Uses of Evidence in Rosenberg
With these distinctions in mind, it will be useful to examine the
treatment of evidence of political views and associations by the trial
judge and by the court of appeals. Notwithstanding the widespread
assumption that Judge Kaufman admitted evidence of the defendants'
political views and associations to show "motive" (to give rise in
turn to an inference that the defendants committed the acts charged),
29
Judge Kaufman's instructions to the jury make clear that he was not
27. A significant question of conspiratorial intent, however, did arise with respect to
Sobell, who argued that the evidence against him indicated, at most, that he intended to
participate with Julius Rosenberg in a conspiracy to transfer information unrelated to
atomic energy and that this alleged conspiracy was distinct from the more comprehensive
atomic bomb conspiracy charged in the indictment. Although Sobell's contention was
rejected on appeal, Judge Frank, dissenting on this point, argued that the question of
Sobell's intent to participate in the larger conspiracy should have been submitted to the
jury. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 600-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1970). See note 6 supra. This requirement, in the wider context
of current espionage statutes, is exhaustively analyzed in Edgar & Schmidt, The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929
(1973). Section 794(a) is also violated if the defendant acts with "intent or reason to
believe that [the information] is to be used to the injury of the United States," but
statutory intent of this nature was not charged in the Rosenberg indictment.
29. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 227-28. See also S. FINEBERG, supra note
3, at 60-61; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 613-14.
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sending the evidence of Communist Party association to the jury for
this purpose. Rather, he instructed the jury to consider evidence of
Party membership and activity only on the question of the defendants'
intent or reason to believe that the information allegedly transmitted
would be used to the advantage of the Soviet Union, a distinct ele-
ment of the offense with which they were charged.30
Yet it seems clear that, in the full context of the case, the disputed
evidence had little, if any, real value for this purpose. If the jury
accepted the Government's contention that the Rosenbergs, amid elab-
orate precautions against detection," had solicited and received in-
formation about the atomic bomb for the express purpose of trans-
mitting that information to the Soviet Union, -3 2 the inference that
the defendants intended to give advantage to the Soviet Union would
seem to arise without question from their performance of the acts
themselves. 33 Further, the conclusion that the Rosenbergs had "reason
to believe" that secret information about the atomic bomb would
give advantage to the Soviet Union would seem to arise with, if any-
thing, even greater clarity. Thus on the question of intent to give
30. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Kaufman stated:
Now I wish to instruct you at this point that I have admitted testimony as to
membership or activity in the Communist Party and also testimony to the effect that
the Communist Party is dedicated to furthering the interests of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics solely on the question of the defendants' intent or reason to
believe that the alleged secret information to be transmitted would be used to the
advantage of a foreign nation, in this case the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which is an element of the charge that the Government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt.
I wish to caution you most strenuously that proof of Communist Party membership
or activity does not prove the offense charged in this indictment, but may be
considered by you solely on the question of intent which is one element of the crime
charged here.
Transcript at 1558 (emphasis added).
Judge Kaufman's remarks in the later stages of the trial generally accord with his in-
structions to the jury. For example, testimony that the Rosenbergs considered the form
of government of the Soviet Union "the ideal form of government" was admitted by the
court on the ground that "[o]ne of the issues in this case is whether or not they intended
to give an advantage to Russia. On that issue I take the evidence." Id. at 789. In ad-
mitting the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley describing the nature of the Communist
Party, Judge Kaufman remarked: "I assume that this is the causal connection that we
have been talking about between the membership in the party and intending to give an
advantage to a foreign government, to wit, the USSR, as charged in the indictment." Id.
at 965 (emphasis added). For a somewhat more ambiguous passage, however, see id. at
1022. Although ignored by some commentators, see note 29 supra, the effect of Judge
Kaufman's instructions was clearly noted by the parties. See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari
at 10, 40 n.14; Brief for the United States in Opposition at 34-35, Rosenberg v. United
States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
31. See, e.g., Transcript at 446-47, 689-90 (use of torn jello box as recognition device).
32. See note 26 supra.
33. See Petition for Certiorari at 45, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
In addition, there was testimony that Julius Rosenberg specifically requested information
that "could be of any value, of any assistance to the Soviet Union." Transcript at 238.
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advantage to the Soviet Union, the incremental probative value of
evidence of Communist Party membership and favorable views con-
cerning the Soviet Union seems little better than nonexistent 4 And
whatever minimal probative value the evidence may have had seems
clearly insufficient to bear the weight of the severe prejudice arising
from abundant evidence of Communist Party membership and ac-
tivities.3 r,
While the trial court instructed the jury to use the disputed evi-
dence solely for the purpose of showing the defendants' intent to
give advantage to the Soviet Union, it appears that the court of ap-
34. Under traditional doctrine it is the incremental probative value of evidence that
is to be weighed against the danger of prejudice-that is, the probative value added by
the eidence in question to that afforded by nonprejudicial evidence otherwise present
in the case. See Dolan, supra note 13, at 250-52; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-
A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND L. REv. 385, 397 & n.48 (1952). In a related area, courts
have excluded evidence of other crimes offered to show defendant's criminal intent
where the only disputed question was whether defendant had performed certain acts and
where there was little question that, if the acts had been performed by defendant, the
requisite intent was present. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918). See Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763,
770-71 (1961).
35. If the defendants had admitted transferring information, but had denied having
the requisite statutory intent or reason to believe, it might have been more clearly neces-
sary for the Government to introduce independent evidence on that element of the offense.
No occasion arose for any such argument in Rosenberg, however, since the defendants
denied that they had transmitted any material whatsoever or had entered into any con-
spiracy to do so. See Petition for Certiorari at 45, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S.
838 (1952).
For similar reasons, cases such as Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947), which
was relied on by the prosecution at trial, Transcript at 414, and cited by the court of
appeals, United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952), seem clearly distinguishable. In Haupt, a treason prosecution, the defendant's
son entered the United States from a German submarine during World War II, for the
purpose of committing sabotage. Allegedly knowing of his son's intentions, defendant
gave him shelter in his house, helped him obtain employment in the bomb-sight factory
in which the son had previously been employed, and assisted him in buying a car. In
order to convict for treason, however, proof of overt acts giving aid and comfort to the
enemy is not enough. Overt acts must be accompanied by an intent to "adhere" to the
enemy; that is, the defendant in performing the acts must intend to direct his allegiance
to the enemy and away from the United States. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29
(1945). The defendant in Haupt argued that his acts were merely the acts of an "in-
dulgent father," and that he did not possess the requisite intent for a conviction of
treason. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. at 642. In order to show intent to adhere to
the enemy-an intent which, according to the defendant, could not be inferred from the
overt acts alone-the Court permitted introduction of defendant's statements "showing
sympathy with Germany and with Hitler and hostility to the United States." Id. In
Haupt, therefore, the value of the evidence of pro-German views was substantial (or at
least more than minimal) on the question of defendant's intent to "adhere" to the
enemy, since inferences on this score to be drawn from the overt acts were ambiguous and
since the defendant specifically argued that no inference of such intent could in fact be
drawn from the overt acts themselves. This case thus seems substantially different from
Rosenberg, where the acts attributed to the Rosenbergs give rise, with absolutely no
ambiguity, to the inference that the acts were performed with intent to give advantage
to the Soviet Union or that defendants had reason to believe that their acts would do so.
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peals affirmed the conviction at least in part on a different theory.
Although Judge Frank's opinion is not entirely clear, it appears that
he proceeded on the assumption that the disputed evidence was sub-
mitted to the jury to raise an inference that the defendants com-
mitted acts of espionage by showing that they had a motive for
committing the acts-use 1(a) above. Judge Frank's opinion approved
testimony that the Rosenbergs "expressed a preference for the Russian
social and economic organization over ours," 36 on the ground that
[a]n American's devotion to another country's welfare cannot of
course constitute proof that he has spied for that other country.
But the jurors may reasonably infer that he is more likely to spy
for it than other Americans not similarly devoted. Hence this
attitude bears on a possible motive for his spying, or on a possible
intent to do so when there is other evidence in the case that he
did such spying.37
Admission of evidence that the defendants were members of the Com-
munist Party was apparently approved, at least in part, on the same
theory:
The government had to prove that the Communist Party was tied
to Soviet causes in order to make membership in it meaningful
as evidence of motive or intent to aid Russia. . . . To that end,
the government put Elizabeth Bentley on the stand. She testified
36. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952).
37. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Frank's reference to "a possible motive for
spying" is a clear reference to use 1(a) above (proof of motive to show that acts of
espionage were performed). The phrase "a possible intent to do so [spy] when there is
other evidence in the case that he did such spying" is more problematic. Since this
reference follows a general statement that "the jurors may reasonably infer that he is
more likely to spy for [another country] than other Americans not similarly devoted" and
is introduced by the word "hence," the phrase may indicate an instance of use 1(b)
above (proof of intention used to give rise to an inference of action). The reference to
"other evidence in the case that he did such spying," although puzzling in this context,
may refer back to Judge Frank's remark that evidence of "[ain American's devotion to
another country's welfare cannot . . . constitute proof"; that is, such evidence will not in
itself suffice to prove the entire crime of espionage.
Alternatively, it is possible that the reference to "intent" may correspond to Judge
Kaufman's use of the same or similar testimony for the purpose of showing intent to
give advantage to the Soviet Union, use 2(c) above. Although such an interpretation
might be thought to be supported by Judge Frank's citation of the Haupt case, the
words "intent to do so" (i.e., intent to spy) might not bear the weight of this interpreta-
tion, particularly in light of Judge Frank's later use of the more apposite, but still
ambiguous, phrase "intent to aid Russia." See p. 1635 infra. However, since any in-
ference from the disputed political statements to the performance of acts of espionage
must proceed through an intermediate inference of a state of mind much like intent to
give advantage to the Soviet Union, it would seem that a use of the evidence to show
action may well include its use to show the statutory intent.
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that the American Communist Party was part of, and subject to,
the Communist International; that the Party received orders from
Russia to propagandize, spy, and sabotage; and that Party mem-
bers were bound to go along with those orders under threat of
expulsion. If the jury believed her, she supplied the missing link
connecting the Communist Party with the Soviet Union, and
making Communist Party membership probative of motive or
intent to aid Russia.8
Since Judge Frank appears to put forth a ground of relevance not
relied upon by the trial court in its instructions, the opinion of the
court of appeals raises the initial question of whether the admission of
arguably prejudicial evidence may be affirmed on the basis of a find-
ing of relevance other than that ultimately relied upon by the trial
judge. A number of decisions suggest, at least, that such an affirmance
is impermissible.3 9 Furthermore, the court of appeals may well have
overestimated the probative value of this evidence through its failure
to analyze carefully the strength of the evidence for the use for which
it was approved. Indeed, Judge Frank's opinion ignored difficult
problems in the admission of both classes of the disputed evidence.
In considering the admissibility of statements expressing "a pref-
erence for the Russian social and economic organization over ours,"
the court of appeals argued that one could infer that an American
"[devoted] to another country's welfare . . . is more likely to spy for
it than other Americans not similarly devoted." 40 Implicit in this
argument is the apparently unconscious conflation of two distinct
38. 195 F.2d at 595-96 (emphasis added).
39. E.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103 (1933); People v. Zackowitz, 254
N.Y. 192, 200, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (1930); State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 378, 218 P.2d
300, 306 (1950). If an appellate court affirms on a theory of relevance other than the
theory asserted by the trial court, the action of the appellate court seems clearly incorrect.
First, the defendant in such a case is deprived of an initial balancing of the probative
value of the evidence for the use newly asserted by the appellate court against the prej-
udicial dangers posed, a balancing confided to the trial judge in the first instance.
Second, the trial judge may actually have decided sub silentio that the evidence was in-
admissible for the purpose asserted by the appellate court.
The latter course seems to have been taken in Rosenberg, since the trial judge ex-
cluded all other uses of the evidence by instructing the jury that the evidence was ad-
missible solely for the purpose of showing intent to give advantage to the Soviet Union.
In so doing, Judge Kaufman would seem to have intentionally rejected the use of the
evidence to show "motive"--use l(a) above-the use ultimately accepted by the court of
appeals. Indeed, Judge Kaufman seems to have entertained precisely that use at an early
point in the trial only to exclude it later. Furthermore, the fact that an appellate court
reaches out for a new basis of relevance suggests a finding by it that the basis asserted
by the trial court was improper or insufficient as a matter of law. Grounds for such a
finding with respect to the basis of relevance asserted in Judge Kaufman's instructions
are suggested in the discussion at pp. 1632-33 supra.
40. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952).
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propositions. The proposition (1) that defendants "expressed a pref-
erence for the Russian social and economic organization over ours"
is viewed by Judge Frank as equivalent to the proposition (2) that
defendants are "[devoted] to another country's welfare." That (1) pre-
supposes (2) may have been widely held as a tenet of Cold War
doctrine, but the two propositions are not equivalent statements.
Clearly, a person can have a preference for a type of "organization"
without preferring the nation in which that type of organization is
found.41 There may be countervailing factors unrelated to social and
economic organization that militate against any such preference. More-
over, even if a "preference" for the foreign nation can be inferred
from a preference for its social and economic organization, a further
logical step is required to transform that "preference," a rather de-
tached judgment, into the type of strong attachment suggested by
the word "devotion."4 2 This transformation is also concealed in Judge
Frank's opinion.
The use of this evidence in the manner suggested by the court of
appeals illustrates the serious problems inherent in using abstract
statements concerning political forms for. the purpose of giving rise
to inferences of illegal action by the speaker. The very inferences
unconsciously drawn by Judge Frank-inferences of devotion to a
suspect foreign nation drawn from general remarks apparently favor-
able to that nation-are precisely those unconscious inferences that
mark periods of political excitement or hysteria.43 In treating the
evidence in this manner, Judge Frank ignored rather than analyzed
the serious problems of questionable probative value posed by the
use of this evidence.
Judge Frank's opinion similarly glosses over difficult analytical
problems in the use of evidence of the Rosenbergs' membership in
the Communist Party. The central problem arises from the fact that
41. In the actual testimony, the phrase "form of government" was prominent. Thus,
according to one witness, the Rosenbergs "were comparing our form of Government to
the form in Russia, and ... they said ...Russia was the ideal form of government, the
Russian form of government." Transcript at 789. See id. at 790. Although testimony
implied that the Rosenbergs' approval of the "Russian form of government" was
enthusiastic, id. at 789-91, defendants seem basically accurate in their argument, before
the Second Circuit, that "there is nothing in the record to justify the description of
approval of particular policies of another country, which was actually testified to, as
preference of that country ...." Reply Brief for Appellant Sobell at 11, United States
v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
42. Thus, the defendants argued that "[n]othing in the proof indicates . .. that this
'preference' had hardened into a devotion to a foreign government or country ..
Petition for Certiorari at 40, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
43. If such inferences are unconsciously drawn by judges, there is at least an equal
danger that they will be drawn by juries. See pp. 1643-44 infra.
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an inference must be drawn from the defendants' membership in a
specific, named organization about which jurors have no firsthand
knowledge. Such an inference is substantially different from those
ordinarily drawn by jurors from the generalized material of their
own experience. 44 Certainly newspapers, books, and other out-of-
court sources that describe the supposed qualities of a specific group
should not suffice to permit a jury to draw inferences from mem-
bership in that group.45 In an attempt to meet this problem and to
provide evidence at trial of the character of the Communist Party-
from which a further inference of the defendants' individual state
of mind and actions might then be drawn-the Government called
Elizabeth Bentley, an "expert" on the affairs of the Communist Party
of the United States.40 Testifying that she had taken part in espionage,
Bentley asserted that control was exercised by the Soviet Union over
the activities of the American Communist Party4 7 and that the Party
"only served the interests of Moscow." 48 If members refused to carry
out the wishes of the Soviet Union, they would be expelled from
the Party.4
9
Regarding Bentley's testimony, it should be noted, first, that the
jurors were asked to use this expert testimony to reach a conclusion
not based upon clear or determinate principles. Bentley's testimony did
not pertain, for example, to the scientific underpinnings of a medical
malpractice suit or to the working of machinery. Rather, her testi-
mony was one person's (perhaps self-serving) theory about what is
44. Ordinarily, inferences are based on propositions drawn from the general ex-
perience of jurors. James, supra note 12, at 696 n.15. The nature of a specific group and
the relations between that group and its members, however, are not matters of general
experience. Indeed, any person who had firsthand experience with the specific group in
question would have bcen excused from the jury.
45. Use of such sources for the purpose of imputing attributes to a specific group
should be no more permissible than the use of such out-of-court sources to determine
the nature of an individual defendant in the course of a trial. Accordingly, decisions
under the Smith Act indicate that nothing like judicial notice of the attributes of the
Communist Party may be used against a defendant in a criminal trial. Rather, the Party's
relevant attributes must be established at trial in each case. Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 299 (1961).
46. Elizabeth Bentley, the "Red Spy Queen" of contemporary newspaper accounts
was a former member of the Communist Party who had testified at two earlier trials and
at a number of congressional hearings. For a critical analysis of her career as a witness
particularly before congressional investigating committees, see H. PACKER, Ex-ComMUNIST
WITNESSES 52-120 (1962). See also Bentley's autobiographical account, E. BENTLEY, OUT OF
BONDAGE (1951).
47. Specifically, Bentley testified that the Soviet Union exercised control over Earl
Browder, a leader of the Party during the period involved in her testimony. Transcript
at 978.
48. Id. at 978.
49. Id. at 978-79.
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likely to have been a highly complex phenomenon, the structure
and nature of the Communist Party of the United States during a
particular period. Second, it should be noted that there is no clear
indication that Bentley was at all familiar with the Communist Party
circles of which the defendants were said to have been members.
Accordingly, even if one accepts Bentley's testimony concerning the
workings of organizational discipline on Party members of her ac-
quaintance, there was no clear testimony about the discipline exerted
on the Rosenbergs, on Sobell, or on the subgroups of the Party with
which the Rosenbergs and Sobell may have been involved.
In general, inferring an individual's actions or state of mind from
membership in an organization involves a double process of inference
with double uncertainties. First, an inference must be drawn about
the tenets of the organization from party documents or from state-
ments of individuals other than the defendants. Such an inference
often raises difficult problems: how does one know that the views
of a particular officer or member of the organization represent the
"views" of the organization as a whole?50 If this problem is overcome
an even more serious difficulty remains. If the defendant belongs to an
organization that possesses many political views and goals, how strong
is the inference that he, as an individual, shared the particular tenets
of the organization that are in question?51 Again, Judge Frank's
opinion glosses over these substantial problems without analysis. As
a result, he ignored several difficult steps in the chain of inference
originating with evidence of the Rosenbergs' membership in the Com-
munist Party and thereby failed to explore important weaknesses in
the probative value of that evidence.52
50. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) (prosecution under mem-
bership clause of Smith Act in which the Court, in assessing evidence that Communist
Party advocated violent overthrow of government, required sufficient (direct or circum-
stantial) evidence "to justify the inference that such a call to violence may fairly be
imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to some narrow segment of it); Scythes
v. Webb, 307 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1962) (judicial refusal to attribute views of leader of
Socialist Workers Party to Party in general).
51. The defendants in Rosenberg thus argued that the Government had not shown
"that the Rosenbergs personally accepted the alleged tenets of the Communist Party
relevant here, or even knew of them." Petition for Certiorari at 42, Rosenberg v. United
States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
52. Although the probative value of Communist Party membership in the form
presented seems weak, there was a serious risk that the jury might draw a strong in-
ference of the defendants' propensity to commit espionage from their Communist Party
membership. Such an inference would be based not upon the tenuous evidence of
Elizabeth Bentley introduced at trial, but rather upon the jurors' own assessment of the
traits of Communist Party members and their propensity to commit espionage derived
from out-of-court sources such as newspapers, magazines, and the other raw materials of
popular opinion. The jury's use of out-of-court material for this purpose, however, would
1638
Vol. 86: 1622, 1977
First Amendment Limitations on Evidence
When Judge Frank moved to a consideration of the possible prej-
udicial impact of the disputed evidence, his treatment was charac-
teristic of appellate review under the traditional standard. This stan-
dard confides to the trial judge the weighing of probative value and
prejudicial danger and permits reversal on appeal only for an egre-
gious error in striking the balance.5" Having established the logical
relevance of the evidence, Judge Frank found that the trial court had
not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. He suggested,
moreover, that if the defendants feared that the judge's limiting in-
structions would not be followed by the jury, they should have sought
a trial by the judge alone.
5 4
Although Judge Frank's opinion appears to assume that the appro-
priate assessment of prejudice had been undertaken by the trial court,
Judge Kaufman did not clearly indicate that he viewed the risk of
prejudice as a substantial factor to be weighed against the probative
value of evidence of Communist Party association.55 Yet in the Rosen-
berg case, coming as it did in the heart of the Cold War period, evi-
dence of the defendants' views and of their Communist Party affil-
iations unquestionably posed grave dangers of prejudice.56
seem to be improper. See pp. 1636-37 & notes 44-45 supra. The possibility of this type
of prejudicial use, in an extreme form, was acknowledged by the trial judge in Rosenberg
when he cautioned the jury that "proof of Communist Party membership or activity does
not prove the offense charged in this indictment .... " Transcript at 1558. The "offense
charged in this indictment," of course, was conspiracy to commit espionage.
53. See p. 1627 supra.
54. 195 F.2d at 596. It seems dubious practice, however, to foster techniques that
unduly encourage a criminal defendant to waive the right to trial by jury. Further, under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) the prosecution may ordinarily prevent the defendant from
securing a trial by the judge alone. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); Boudin,
supra note 3, at 261-62. Among the other problematic aspects of Judge Frank's sug-
gestion is the important fact that trial by jury affords the defendant a trier of fact
from which prejudicial evidence may actually be withheld. The trial judge acting as
trier of fact may or may not be able to perform the elaborate mental act of excluding
inadmissible evidence from Isis mind; with a jury, however, the trier will ordinarily not
hear the excluded evidence at all. For this reason as well, the possibility of securing
a trial by judge alone seems inadequate as a substitute for the rigorous exclusion of
unduly prejudicial evidence in a jury trial.
55. In a number of instances, for example, Judge Kaufman appeared content to admit
the disputed evidence, once satisfied of its "connection" or logical relevance. See, e.g.,
Transcript at 1038-39; see also id. at 424.
56. Not long before the Rosenbergs' trial, the New York Court of Appeals remarked
that "it is undeniable that for communism and its adherents and sympathizers, there has
been widespread public aversion." Menclier v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100, 75 N.E.2d 257,
259 (1947) (libel action). In the period in question, such "widespread aversion" continued
to be prevalent, as reflected in such sources as congressional legislation, Internal Security
Act of 1950, § 2(1), (15), 50 U.S.C. § 781(l), (15) (1970), judicial opinions, American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422-45 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dis-
senting), and public opinion polls, S. STOUFFER, Co. MUNIS.u%, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 40-41 (1955).
Two members of the jury in the Rosenberg case have recently recalled holding similar
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Furthermore, even if some evidence of defendants' political views
and Communist Party membership might properly have been ad-
mitted, it does not necessarily follow that the jury should have been
permitted to hear the amount of evidence on this point that was
actually introduced.57 Excessive repetition may emphasize the prej-
udicial aspect of the evidence without significantly increasing its
probative value. In this light it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that more of the disputed evidence was introduced at trial than could
have been justified by any legitimate purpose.5
8
To summarize, even under the traditional test for admissibility, the
decision in United States v. Rosenberg entailed serious problems.
There was not only substantial ambiguity and even contradiction in
the treatment of the evidentiary issues by the trial and appellate courts,
but also a failure to undertake the careful analysis that may have
exposed a serious overestimate of the probative value of the evi-
dence. Certainly neither court confronted the difficult problems latent
in the nature of the disputed evidence-problems that might have
been more clearly perceived if deliberate analysis had been under-
taken. As a result, the introduction of much of the disputed evidence
seems to have been questionable even under the traditional test. Per-
haps most importantly, however, underlying the somewhat cursory
treatment by both courts was a failure to recognize that serious First
Amendment issues were presented by this ostensibly routine dispute
over the introduction of evidence.
II. The Need for a First Amendment Prophylactic Rule
Even under the traditional balancing test, there were serious prob-
lems in the disposition of the evidentiary issues in United States v.
views at the time of the trial. In a recent television interview, the jury foreman com-
mented that "[d]uring my younger days, the idea of a Communist connoted something
evil or dirty. It was a dirty word, actually." A. GOLDSTEIN, THE UNQUIET DE.TH OF
JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG (unnumbered pages) (1975). Another member of the july
remarked:
[C]ommunism was . . . a bad thing. After all we'd helped [them] in World War II,
bailed them out, and here they are coming back at us ... anyway they could. Taking
over all those European nations and making slave states out of [them]; so . . . I
think the feeling against communism was much more prevalent then than it is today.
Id.
57. See Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 613-14.
58. One commentator has remarked:
With respect to the Rosenbergs, there remains an uneasy feeling that by constant
reference to ideological questions, the Government, at best, came perilously close to
misdirecting the jury's attention away from legitimate issues; at worst, it took ad-
vantage of a limited exception for proof-of-motive to obtain a conviction based
primarily on evidence of political heresy.
Id. at 614. See Boudin, supra note 3, at 258-59. But see Columbia Note, supra note 3, at
227-28 (approving introduction of evidence).
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Rosenberg. Whatever the result should have been under the tradi-
tional test, however, it is highly questionable whether that test, with
its corollary of minimal appellate review, satisfies the imperatives of
the First Amendment for assessing the admissibility of evidence of a
criminal defendant's political speech or association. In such instances
a more restrictive rule of exclusion should be applied.
The basic case for a more restrictive rule can be simply put. When-
ever evidence of unpopular but protected speech or association is in-
troduced against a criminal defendant, the jury may make improper
use of that evidence by penalizing the exercise of First Amendment
rights. In a criminal trial, the jury as a constituent of the court ex-
ercises the power of the state. Hence, the improper penalization of
protected speech by a jury violates the First Amendment to the same
extent as analogous action by any other governmental entity. It is par-
ticularly difficult, of course, to determine whether a jury has reached
its decision on an improper basis. Courts must therefore take measures
to lessen the risk that the jury may decide a case on such grounds.
Although similar considerations underlie the traditional balancing of
probative value against prejudicial danger, when the risk of prejudice
involves a threat to First Amendment values the applicable test ought
to be considered an aspect of First Amendment law, to be determined
in accordance with First Amendment principles developed in other
areas. Since it is established that procedural guarantees must be applied
with special strictness when First Amendment rights are at stake, the
admissibility of evidence of a defendant's protected speech or associa-
tion should be determined by a test substantially more stringent than
the balancing test ordinarily applicable in the case of evidence posing
significant risks of prejudice.
A. First Amendment Violations
When the government introduces evidence of speech or association
protected by the First Amendment to prove a nonspeech offense, it
creates the danger that First Amendment interests will be impaired in
one or more of three ways: first, the jury may convict the defendant,
not because it is convinced that he is guilty of the offense charged, but
to retaliate against him for his protected speech or association; sec-
ond, the jury may draw an unduly strong inference from the de-
fendant's speech or association to his guilt of the offense charged; and,
third, the possibility of the foregoing two violations may exert a
chilling effect on similar speech or association of others.
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1. Retaliation Against Protected Speech or Association
It is clear that the imposition of a disability by a governmental of-
ficial in retaliation for protected speech or association violates the
First Amendment even though the official purports to be acting un-
der a rule that does not, by its terms, penalize that speech or asso-
ciation. Thus, if an applicant is denied a permit to conduct a parade,
not for reasons of public order, but rather because the applicant is
a Republican or because he has said "the mayor should not be re-
elected," the denial violates the First Amendment. Similarly, the
discharge of a governmental employee supposedly for "insubordinate
conduct" violates the First Amendment if the discharge is actually
undertaken in retaliation for protected speech. 59 Moreover, if an in-
dividual is prosecuted for a criminal offense because the prosecutor
disapproves of his political activity, the prosecution violates the First
Amendment even though the defendant may be guilty of the offense
charged.6 ° In a criminal trial, of course, the jury exercises the power
of the state.61 If under the guise of convicting a defendant of a crim-
inal offense, a jury actually retaliates against him for speech that is
protected under the First Amendment-punishing him for the speech,
apart from any assessment of his guilt or innocence of the offense
charged-the jury's action violates the First Amendment to the same
extent as a penalty imposed for similar reasons by any other govern-
mental officer.
62
59. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 355-60 (1976) (plurality opinion).
60. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (ordering
evidentiary hearing to determine whether prosecution for failure to possess draft card was
instituted in retaliation for defendant's activities as draft counselor); United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (reversing conviction for failing to answer census
questions on ground that prosecution was undertaken in retaliation for defendant's
participation in anti-census movement); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th
Cir. 1972) (reversing convictions on ground that prosecution for demonstrations was
undertaken in retaliation for content of defendants' speech). See Amsterdam, The One-
Sided Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 RuT.-C,\'s. L.J. 1 (1974).
61. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 132 (1949).
62. Of course the conviction by a jury for any patently improper reason-for example,
because the defendant has red hair-can be viewed as a denial of due process. The de-
fendant has been convicted of an act (or a condition) that is not a crime or that, at any
rate, has not been included in the indictment or information on which he is being tried.
See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) ("Conviction upon a charge not
made would be sheer denial of due process.") Courts ordinarily try to guard against this
type of improper conviction through traditional evidentiary exclusionary rules, including
the standard balancing test, and through the use of prophylactic jury instructions.
The thesis of this article is that, even though conviction on any improper basis may
be thought to constitute a violation of due process, the dangers of improper conviction
are so acute when evidence of protected speech is introduced against a criminal de-
fendant, and the policies of the First Amendment so particularly strong, that prophy-
lactic rules more stringent than the traditional balancing test must be applied.
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The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions acknowledged the
likelihood of undetectable retaliation against protected speech by
governmental officers and boards and has created First Amendment
techniques for the purpose of guarding against such retaliation.03 As
the Court has indicated, analogous retaliation by juries also seems
likely.0
4
2. Unduly Strong Inferences from Protected Speech or Association
The risk of retaliation is not the only danger posed to First Amend-
ment rights when evidence of protected speech or association is in-
troduced against a criminal defendant. There is also the danger that
the jury may draw a stronger inference than is warranted from the
defendant's speech or association to his guilt of the offense charged,
and thereby impose a burden on the exercise of First Amendment
rights. 3 Unduly strong inferences of guilt from protected speech or
association may take a number of forms. For example, a jury might
unreasonably infer that members of an unpopular political group,
or persons holding unpopular political views, are evil persons and
are therefore more likely than others to commit crimes in general.
The unarticulated major premise supporting such an inference ap-
pears to have been widely held during the Cold War period with
respect to members of the Communist Party, who were commonly
63. See notes 101 & 103 infra.
64. See pp. 1658-60 infra.
65. The likelihood that evidence will be seriously overvalued by a jury is one of
the most persistent and widespread dangers imperiling the fairness of trials. In fact, fears
of prejudice of this general type figure prominently in many of the most conspicuous
aspects of the law of evidence. Thus, one of the reasons for placing strict limitations on
the introduction of evidence of prior convictions of a criminal defendant is the fear
that the jury may draw an unreasonably strong inference from defendant's prior crimes
to his guilt of the crime for which he is presently being tried. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 153 (1977); 1 J. NVIG.ORE, supra note 19,
§ 194, at 650. Similarly, hearsay is excluded principally because it may be overvalued by
a jury that is unaware of the special weaknesses of evidence considered without cross-
examination. See Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50
HARv. L. REv. 909, 919 (1937) (characterizing Wigmore's view); Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 334-36 (1961) (listing three factors said to under-
lie hearsay rule); cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 (1968) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (risk of overvaluation of evidence said to underlie confrontation clause of Sixth
Amendment). But see Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U.
Cm. L. REV. 247 (1937).
The risk of prejudice of this general type has been noted recently by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), in which the Court reversed a conviction
on the ground that the prosecutor had attempted to impeach the defendant's testimony
by referring to defendant's silence at the time of arrest. According to the Court, "a
significant potential for prejudice" lay in the fact "that the jury is likely to assign
much more weight to the defendant's previous silence than is warranted." 1d. at 180
(emphasis added).
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believed to be tainted by some fundamental personal evil. 6 Simi-
larly, the jury may draw an inference from evidence of protected
speech or association to a more specific propensity to commit the
crime charged and may endow that inference with a strength not
reasonably warranted by the evidence. 67 This danger is particularly
acute when inferences of criminality are drawn from association with
a specific group, and when the inferences are based not on evidence
introduced at trial but rather on the jury's own views of the group in
question, drawn from out-of-court sources. 68 In times of political ten-
sion, there is a substantial likelihood that information from such
sources will be used, consciously or unconsciously, to impute an undue
propensity to specific crimes to members of well-known and offensive
political groups.
If prejudicial inferences of this type are drawn from evidence of
protected speech, a heavy burden is imposed upon the exercise of
First Amendment rights. The burden so placed on First Amendment
rights is not unlike the burden on Fifth Amendment rights found
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. California.9 In
Griffin the Court held that comment by the trial judge or the prosecu-
tor on the defendant's failure to take the stand-comment that ex-
plicitly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the de-
fendant's failure to testify-infringed the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights. The Court noted that such comment "is a penalty imposed by
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the
privilege by making its assertion costly." 70 The drawing of an undue
66. See note 56 supra.
67. Thus, general statements of approval of the policies of a foreign country may
slightly increase the probability that the speaker might commit espionage or other
criminal acts on behalf of that country; yet in times of political tension, popular feeling
may endow such an inference with undue strength.
68. Such a danger appears to have been present in the Rosenberg trial. See note 52
supra. It should be no more permissible for a finder of fact to use out-of-court sources for
the purpose of imputing supposed attributes to a specific group or to a particular member
of that group than it is for a finder of fact to determine the nature of a defendant from
what he has heard about that individual from out-of-court sources. See p. 1637 & note
45 supra.
69. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
70. Id. at 614. It is noteworthy that in Griffin the trial court's explicit sanctioning of
the questionable inference was held impermissible, at least in part on the ground that
the jury might draw an erroneously strong inference of guilt from the defendant's failure
to take the stand. Id. at 614-15. See also United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d
613 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973) (prosecutor's comment on defendant's tele-
phone call to lawyer on morning after crime held unconstitutional penalty on defendant's
exercise of Sixth Amendment rights because it suggested that guilt might be inferred
from consultation with counsel).
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inference of guilt from protected speech is similarly a penalty, im-
posed here by the jury for exercising a constitutional right.
7 1
3. The Chilling Effect
One further burden may be imposed upon First Amendment rights
when evidence of protected speech or association is introduced against
a criminal defendant. In certain types of prosecutions, the introduction
of such evidence may exert a "chilling effect" on the speech or asso-
ciation of other persons, who will fear that evidence of their own
controversial political activity may be introduced against them if they
should be prosecuted for a similar offense.72 Substantial danger of
chilling protected expression may be present, for example, if protected
public speech can be introduced in the trial of the speaker on charges
of planning or organizing disturbances that may occur before or after
the speech in question.7 3 Thus in the Chicago Eight prosecution, much
of the Government's evidence that the defendants had conspired to
cross state lines to plan or incite riots was composed of films and
testimony concerning public speeches given by the defendants and
others before and during demonstrations in Chicago at the time of
the Democratic National Convention.7 4 The nature of the possible
chilling effect on future speech is suggested by the remarks of one
of the defendants in that case:
71. The dangers posed by a penalty of this sort are not mitigated by the fact that,
since the drawing of an unduly strong inference of guilt is largely an unconscious process,
the jury itself will not perceive that a penalty is being imposed on protected speech
or association.
72. On tse place of the "chilling effect" in First Amendment doctrine, see Note, The
Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 809-32 (1969); Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852-58 (1970); Note, Over-
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 'N.Y.U.L. Rv. 532 (1974).
73. Professor Emerson has commented that
expression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows that what he says can
he used against him at a later time if some unforeseen action ensues, can be taken
into account by a jury in determining his state of mind in performing a subsequent
act, or can perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury's general verdict against him.
T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 405. See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 926 n.325 (1970) (in certain conspiracy prosecutions,
"[s]ubmission of evidence of public advocacy to the jury as probative of guilt may create
the same sort of chill as a statute that by terms prohibits advocacy"); Note, Conspiracy
and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 894 (1970) ("The chilling effect caused by
the use of protected expression as evidence in a conspiracy trial is the same as that which
flows from prosecuting an individual for the speech itself.")
74. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 394-407 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973). See also People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 227 N.E.2d 829, 833, 281
N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 (1967), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 390 U.S. 29 (1968) (defendant's
public speeches introduced in trial on charges of planning riots in Harlem in 1964).
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Whatever we said in peaceful assemblies, in churches, or to the
news media was eventually collected as part of the evidence prov-
ing our guilt for what finally happened in Chicago.
The dangers of this doctrine are obvious. . . . [U]nder the
doctrine a spokesman becomes responsible for any violence or
illegal activity occurring at a demonstration he plans or en-
courages. If it can be proven that you have a defiant and rebel-
lious "state of mind," you can be indicted even if your only
concrete act is bringing people on a bus to Chicago.
75
As a practical matter it may be difficult to prove the "chilling ef-
fect" of any particular governmental burden on speech; yet statutes
have frequently been struck down on the ground that they discouraged
protected speech, without any requirement that such an effect be
shown by specific proof or more general empirical evidenceY3 In a
number of instances of overbreadth adjudication, the Court has in
effect assumed that a statute will chill protected speech even where
there is a strong likelihood that any chilling effect is not particu-
larly severe. 77 The Court has thus frequently guarded against the
risk of a chilling effect that may undetectably discourage protected
speech.
B. Lessening the Risk of First Amendment Violations
One or more of the foregoing burdens may be imposed whenever evi-
dence of protected expression is introduced against a criminal de-
fendant. The danger is particularly severe in times of political tension
when evidence of especially disfavored views or associations may be
considered by a jury. In any particular case, however, it is ordinarily
impossible to know whether the jury has retaliated against the de-
fendant or has drawn an unduly strong inference from the defendant's
protected speech or association to his guilt of the offense charged.
Either of these violations of the First Amendment would ordinarily be
concealed in the jury's general verdict of guilty, since, as a practical
matter, it is rarely possible to determine the precise considerations on
which a jury's decision is based. Furthermore, the policy of protecting
the confidentiality of jury deliberations has prompted comprehensive
75. T. HAYDEN, TRIAL 25 (1970).
76. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (ordinance requiring identifica-
tion of author of handbills unconstitutionally discourages protected speech). For all
exception, see Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1976) (minority parties not protected
from compelled disclosure of contributors, required under federal election law, ill tcie
absence of proof of "reasonable probability" of harassment).
77. For recent examples, see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
1646
Vol. 86: 1622, 1977
First Amendment Limitations on Evidence
rules designed to insulate the jury's decision from attack on the ground
that it was motivated by improper factors..7  Thus while it may some-
times be possible to detect decisions by mayors or other public officials
to penalize protected speech, an analogous determination with respect
to juries is ordinarily impossible.
79
Since it is not possible to determine whether any specific convic-
tion rests on the jury's penalization of protected expression, First
Amendment interests can be protected only by measures designed to
lessen the risk that the jury may decide a case on such a basis. Under
traditional evidentiary theory, such a goal might conceivably be
achieved either by requiring appropriate limiting instructions to the
jury or by excluding from the trial some or all evidence of the de-
fendant's protected speech or association.
It seems clear that limiting instructions do not provide an adequate
safeguard. Even in theory, limiting instructions could be used to guard
only against retaliation and the clearest forms of unduly strong infer-
ences from protected speech; 80 it would seem impossible to frame a
clear instruction that would guard against the subtler but still very
potent possibility of an inflated assessment of the strength of the evi-
dence. Even more importantly, courts and commentators have long
acknowledged the dubious effectiveness of limiting instructions for
78. FED. R. EviD. 606(b), for example, disqualifies a juror from testifying "to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith," except with respect to information or influences from sources outside the
courtroom. See Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 65-72, 102 A.2d 714, 719-22 (1954) (Sobeloff,
C.J.) (reviewing history and justification of rule against jury self-impeachment). See gen-
erally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at §§ 2346-56 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
The possibility of undetectable prejudicial use of evidence is not solely a function of
the law's reluctance to monitor or reveal the jury's deliberations. The extent to which
the jurors are in fact making impermissible use of evidence may not even be clear to the
jurors themselves. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 87 (1966). The fact
that First Amendment prejudice may be subtlk, however, does not mean that it is not
effective or does not require prophylactic rules to reduce the substantial risks that it
raises.
79. If a school board impermissibly takes protected speech into account in dis-
charging a teacher, the board might still prevail in resulting civil litigation, if it can
prove that the teacher would ha e been discharged for reasons independent of the speech
in question. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 575-76
(1977). Analogous inquiry and proof, however, seem out of the question with respect to
a general verdict of guilty handed down in a criminal case in which evidence of de-
fendant's protected activity has been submitted to the jury.
80. Thus, in United States v. Rosenberg, the trial court instructed the jury that
evidence of Communist Party membership did not in itself constitute sufficient evidence
upon which a conviction could be based. See note 52 supra. Similarly, the court might
have specifically instructed tie jury to consider only evidence of the nature of the
Communist Party presented in court, and not any information on that subject derived
from out-of-court sources. Such an instruction, while at least intelligible, would probably
have had little if any practical effect.
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the purpose of eliminating or reducing severe dangers of prejudice.8,
Moreover, in notable instances the Supreme Court has found that
limiting instructions are insufficient to safeguard specific constitu-
tional rights against improper actions by juries.8
2
An exclusionary rule of evidence is therefore the only effective
technique for insulating the defendant from the violations of the
First Amendment discussed here. Thus it is necessary to consider
whether the present standard for the exclusion of prejudicial evidence,
under which evidence is admitted unless its prejudicial force substan-
tially outweighs its probative value, affords adequate protection to First
Amendment values or whether, on the contrary, a more stringent rule
of exclusion should be applied when evidence of protected speech
or association is introduced against a criminal defendant.
A more stringent rule of exclusion, designed to safeguard First
Amendment interests, would increase the difficulty of introducing
evidence of protected speech or association against a criminal de-
fendant, even though the evidence is relevant to one or more ele-
ments of the offense charged. In some instances, therefore, the gov-
ernment may lose the benefit of legitimate inferences to be drawn
from the evidence in question, in order to decrease the risk that pro-
tected expression will be penalized in one or more of the ways dis-
cussed above. The imposition of such a prophylactic rule must rest
on the decision that, to some extent, other governmental values must
be subordinated in order to assure more effectively that First Amend-
ment values are not burdened.
Such a special prophylactic rule would well accord with First
Amendment doctrine developed in other contexts. The Supreme Court
has frequently imposed special prophylactic rules which have the ef-
fect of impeding the achievement of legitimate governmental goals in
order to decrease the risk that protected speech will be improperly
81. E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."); E. MORGAN, SOMIE
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 105 (1956). Com-
pare the following assessment by Judge Frank:
What a crop of subsidiary semi-myths and mythical practices the jury system yields!
Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words which the
judge may address to the jury, although everyone who stops to see and think knows
that these words might as well be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all
the jury's understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language. ...
Do not those unintelligible words uttered by the judge in the presence of the
jury resemble the talismanic words of Word-Magic? ...
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1935) (footnotes omitted).
82. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964). But see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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burdened. Procedural rules of particular stringency are required
where First Amendment values are threatened, in recognition of the
fact that First Amendment rights form the "matrix, the indispensable
condition" of other constitutional freedoms. 83 A special set of rules
has been imposed, for example, when a proceeding may result in a
"prior restraint" on speech or association. 84 These rules reflect the
view that procedural safeguards more stringent than those otherwise
required by due process must be employed when there is a risk that
First Amendment rights may be erroneously infringed.83
So crucial, in fact, is the procedural protection of speech that even
the safeguards required by another specific constitutional right may
not always suffice when speech is involved. Thus, although the Fourth
Amendment provides restrictions on searches and seizures, the First
Amendment requires even more stringent procedures when the ma-
terial to be seized includes items, such as books or films, that may
constitute protected speech. Accordingly, the First Amendment im-
poses its own, more stringent, limitations on warrantless seizures 0
83. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). See generally Cahn, Tile Firstness
of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956); McKay, The Preference for Freedom,
34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L.
REv. 518 (1970).
84. The procedures required for the censorship of films, for example, are set out in
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1965) (requiring that final determinations of
obscenity be made by court, rather than administrative body, even though proceeding is
not criminal in nature; that censor bear burden of proving obscenity; and that judicial
determination be made as quickly as possible). "The teaching of our cases is that, be-
cause only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary
sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination
suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 58. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560, 562 (1975) (Freedman procedures required of municipal
theater before rejecting application of allegedly obscene play); United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971) (same in seizures by customs agents);
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 421 (1971) (same in postal censorship). *
Special First Amendment limits have also been placed on the ability of the states to
secure ex parte restraining orders against parades, demonstrations, and other conduct
related to speech, even though such orders may be perfectly proper when speech or
association is not involved. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175, 180, 184
(1968).
85. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
86. In Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a police
officer who believes that he has seen an obscene film may not make a warrantless seizure
of the film, even incident to the arrest of the exhibitor.
The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been easy to secure
a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by
books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. ...
[W]e examine what is "unreasonable" in the light of the values of freedom of ex-
pression.
Id. at 504 (emphasis added). See Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 990-91, 429
P.2d 192, 198, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (1967) ("While it is settled that in the ordinary
case a search incident to an arrest is not 'unreasonable' if the arrest itself is lawful .. .
the First Amendment compels more restrictive rules in cases in which the arrest and
search relate to alleged obscenity." (citations omitted)).
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and its own requirements for obtaining a search warrant.8 7 Further,
the Supreme Court has required a heightened degree of specificity
in a search warrant's description of "things to be seized" when those
"'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which
they contain."' 8 The First Amendment thus requires procedural pro-
tection superseding that provided by another constitutional right.
Another way in which the Supreme Court has given First Amend-
ment rights special protection is by shifting burdens of persuasion
and by increasing standards of proof in order to give speech greater
protection than otherwise required by due process. These doctrines
rest on the belief that, if error is to occur in the First Amendment
context, it is better to err in favor of speech and that the state must
sometimes forgo proper penalization of unprotected activity in order
to assure that protected speech is not erroneously burdened.
In the leading case of Speiser v. Randall,9 for example, the Court
struck down a provision requiring that, as a condition of receiving
a veteran's property tax exemption, a taxpayer bear the burden of
proving that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment. Ordinarily the state may require a taxpayer to bear the
burden of proof on all questions of liability for taxes 0° Where gov-
ernmental action threatened to penalize expression, however, "the
transcendental value of speech" required that the burden be shifted
to the government. Shifting the burden of proof to the government
may sometimes result in protection being erroneously extended to
unprotected speech. Nevertheless, the otherwise valid governmental
interest must give way before the more powerful imperatives of the
First Amendment.
The basic principle of Speiser v. Randall was reaffirmed in New
87. A judicial warrant for the seizure of books may not rest "on the strength of the
conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by the judge of any
materials considered ... to be obscene." Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32
(1961) (alternate holding). Further, a judicial warrant for the seizure of a film may not
be issued "solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer [who viewed the
film] without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the of-
ficer's conclusions." Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per
curiam).
88. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). As Justice Harlan remarked, where
books are seized, "the most 'scrupulous exactitude' is demanded in the warrant's descrip-
tion; ...but where the special problems associated with the First Amendment are not
involved ... a more 'reasonable particularity,' ... is permissible." Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 98 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (plurality opinion); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
732 (1961).
89. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
90. Id. at 523-24.
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan.91 There the Supreme Court held that,
under the First Amendment, public officials suing for libel must bear
the burden of proving that the defendant's statements were made with
knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.92 In contrast, the
pre-existing state rule had placed the burden of proving "truth" on
the defendant. The Court thus relieved the speaker of the effective
burden of proving whether or not the speech is insulated, from liability
and imposed that burden on the party seeking to penalize the speech
in question.93
The Court, moreover, has required an unusually high standard of
proof in order to guard First Amendment interests against an er-
roneous finding of fact. A public official who sues for libel, for ex-
ample, must prove "actual malice" with "convincing clarity," in con-
trast to the less exacting "preponderance" test ordinarily applicable
in tort litigation.94 The higher standard of proof is necessary because
"an erroneous judgment of liability is, in view of the First Amend-
ment values at stake, of more serious" concern than an erroneous
judgment in the opposite direction . .. .- 5
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. Id. at 279-80.
93. Speiser v. Randall was also followed in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),
in which the Court held that a state censorship board must bear the burden of instituting
proceedings for a restraining order and must bear the burden of persuasion on the
question of obscenity; and, more recently, in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972), in
which the Court made clear that a state college must bear the burden of showing that a
student political organization was not entitled to recognition.
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026
(5th Cir. 1975) ("evidence of actual malice must be clear and convincing, more than a
preponderance").
Similarly, in denaturalization proceedings resting on the citizen's alleged lack of
"attachment" to the principles of the Constitution, that allegation must be established
by "clear and unequivocal" proof, at least in part because First Amendment values are
at issue. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943). See McKay, supra note
83, at 1222 n.179. Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) (same standards apply
to proof of fraud in swearing oath of allegiance to United States); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944) (same).
95. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 472 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Particularly strict appellate scrutiny of the sufficiency of evidence has been undertaken
by the Supreme Court in reviewing libel judgments under the New York Times standard,
as well as in other areas in which there may be a substantial risk that finders of fact
might not apply First Amendment doctrines with sufficient understanding. E.g., Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282
(1974). Such action reflects distrust of the ability or willingness of the jury to give
adequate protection to First Amendment values. Similar First Amendment concerns
have dictated a heightened readiness to grant summary judgments against plaintiffs in
defamation cases, a practice that results in removing the decision from juries and avoid-
ing the chilling effect of long and expensive trials. See, e.g., Guitar v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d
Cir. 1976) ("because of the importance of free speech, summary judgment is the 'rule,'
and not the exception, in defamation cases" (citing cases)).
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A further way in which the First Amendment is given special pro-
cedural protection is by the relaxation of traditional rules of standing.
In a long line of cases following Thornhill v. Alabama,9" the Su-
preme Court has held that a speaker who is prosecuted (or subjected
to another governmental burden) under an "overbroad" statute-a
statute that prohibits both protected and unprotected speech or re-
lated conduct-may raise the overbreadth of the entire statute as a
defense, even though his own conduct might not be constitutionally
protected.97 In a criminal case, for example, the defendant is ac-
quitted and the statute invalidated even though the defendant's speech
or conduct might constitutionally have been penalized under a more
narrowly drawn statute.98
The overbreadth doctrine rests principally on the concern that the
mere existence of overbroad statutes will exert a chilling effect on
protected speech by posing a continuing threat of prosecution. Rules
of standing are therefore relaxed in order to secure an early invali-
dation of overbroad statutes.99 This doctrine of First Amendment over-
breadth is an extraordinary technique: in most other areas a litigant
whose conduct is not constitutionally protected has no standing to
attack a statute on the ground that it might be applied, in some
future case, to constitutionally protected activity.100 The doctrine
again reflects the judgment that special rules are necessary to protect
rights of expression. "In the end, this departure from the normal
method of judging the constitutionality of statutes must find justifi-
cation in the favored status of rights to expression and association in
the constitutional scheme."101
96. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
97. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
98. The sweep of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine has been limited to
some extent by Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), in which the Court held that
a statute would be held invalid only if "substantially" overbroad and elaborated a slid-
ing scale to determine substantiality. The doctrine of "substantial" ovcrbreadth may,
however, have been implicit in earlier overbreadth decisions. See Note, The First Amzend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 918-27 (1970). Moreover, it has been
argued that, "[iun light of [Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)], it appears
that Broadrick's only real impact will be on adjudication involving statutes which
regulate [speech-related] conduct rather than speech." Note, Overbreadth Review and
the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532, 544 (1974). But see Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct.
2691, 2707-08 (1977) (overbreadth doctrine held inapplicable to professional advertising,
"a context where [the doctrine] is not necessary to further its intended objective").
99. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 853-
55 (1970).
100. Id. at 852 & n.33.
101. Id. at 852 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to the chilling effect rationale, it has been asserted that this First Amend-
ment technique also rests, to some extent, on the Court's wish to minimize the risk of
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Similar considerations have also resulted in the creation of a special
First Amendment doctrine of vagueness. Although the doctrine of
vagueness has long been applied as a general constituent of due
process,102 its particularly strict application to statutes concerning
speech clearly marks the doctrine as another special First Amendment
prophylactic technique. "Due process requires that a criminal statute
provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his
contemplated conduct is illegal .... Where First Amendment rights
are involved, an even 'greater degree of specificity' is required."' °3
Finally, in reviewing convictions for group activity related to po-
litical association, courts have created special First Amendment evi-
dentiary rules, more stringent than those ordinarily required by due
process, to restrict the inferences that may be drawn from evidence
of political association. The special First Amendment rules are de-
rived from the Supreme Court's requirement that, in order to es-
undetectable retaliation against the content of speech on the part of law enforcement
officers and triers of fact. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 844, 872-73 (1970). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (overbroad
statute "lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecution of-
ficials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure"). Similar fears
underlie numerous decisions striking down statutes that grant broad power to ad-
ministrators to license parades, public meetings, and other speech-related activities,
without sufficiently narrow standards based on neutral criteria such as the flow of
traffic, the ordinary use of the area, and so on. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313
(1958) (permit for solicitation of organization membership); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951) (permit for public worship); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (permission
for use of loudspeaker); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (four cases) (permits for
distribution of literature); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (permit for
distributing literature).
These "overbreadth" decisions rest on the fear that such broad discretion creates a
risk that the licensing official may impermissibly base his decision on the content of
the prospective speech. Although such a decision would violate First Amendment
principles, it could often be masked by a plausible rationalization based on neutral
factors, and thus would evade effective judicial review. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
562 (1948). To guard First Amendment rights against such undetectable retaliation, the
Court has employed the unusual remedy of invalidating the statute on its face.
102. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (statute prohibiting associa-
tion with "any gang consisting of two or more persons" held unconstitutionally vague).
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam).
The vagueness doctrine has additional bearing here since it also rests in part on the
fear that governmental officers, including juries, acting under the cover of vague statutes,
may retaliate in an undetectable manner against the content of protected speech. See
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575-76 (1974); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 492 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (certain vague statutes, by "prescribing indefinite standards
of guilt . . . [allow] the potential vagaries and prejudices of juries, effectively insulated
against control by reviewing courts, the power to intrude upon the protected sphere");
Note, The Void-jor-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
104-09 (1960). In order to reduce the danger of undetectable governmental retaliation, a
vague statute is invalidated on its face. The special doctrine of First Amendment vague-
ness thus suggests that when dangers of undetectable retaliation against protected speech
are present, First Amendment doctrine has required procedural rules of increased
stringency in order to decrease the risk that such retaliation will be undertaken.
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tablish an offense under the membership clause of the Smith Act,104
the government must show not only that the defendant is an "active"
member of an organization advocating action directed toward the
violent overthrow of the government,103 but also that the defendant,
as an individual, possesses the specific intent to accomplish the illegal
goals of the organization. 10 6 In order to guard against the danger
of an erroneous finding of specific intent, the Court emphasized that
an unusually rigorous standard of proof must be satisfied in order
to assure the presence of substantial evidence bearing on each inde-
pendent element of the membership offense:
[I]t should.., be said that ... [the specific intent] element of the
membership crime, like its others, must be judged strictissimi
juris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the
legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically in-
tending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be
punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally pro-
tected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which
he does not necessarily shareloT
In other words, courts must take particular pains to assure that there
is substantial evidence of the specific intent required to link the in-
dividual with the illegal goals of the group. The fundamental poli-
cies of the First Amendment dictate this increased care to assure that
defendants are not in fact being penalized for protected speech or
association, particularly in light of the subtlety and complexity of
the Smith Act offenses.1°s
A number of lower courts have elaborated and sharpened the Su-
preme Court's strictissimi juris standard. In Hellman v. United
States,0 9 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified
the principle, implicit in Scales v. United States" ° and Noto v. United
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
105. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-30 (1961).
106. Id. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-10 (1967); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
107. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961). Correlatively, the Court in
Scales, decided on the same day as Noto, required that there be "clear proof" of the
defendant's proscribed specific intent in order to uphold the conviction. 367 U.S. 203, 229
(1961).
108. See Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203, 232 (1961). The Court in Scales and
Noto also undertook an unusually stringent review of the facts on which the convictions
rested. However, the Court did not focus on the need to exclude certain evidence of
protected speech in order to achieve protection for First Amendment interests. In fact,
in considering a question of admissibility of evidence, the Court in Scales appears to have
endorsed the traditional balancing technique with minimal appellate review. Id. at 256.
See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
109. 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961).
110. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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States,"' that the government must introduce independent evidence
of the defendant's specific intent in order to secure a conviction un-
der the membership clause of the Smith Act. To base a finding of
a defendant's individual intent upon "the facts of active membership
and knowledge of the illegal aims of the Party" would not take into
account the "possibility of an entirely innocent intent," and would
risk penalizing political association alone."12 Whatever conclusions
might be drawn from active and knowing group participation when
political expression is not at issue, the strictissimi juris standard re-
quires a more specific showing where such expression is at issue.
In order to implement this restrictive standard, the court in Hell-
man imposed further limitations on the inferences that could be
drawn even from the action or speech of the defendant himself. Thus,
inferences drawn from the defendant's own Communist Party activity
would suffice to show the proscribed specific intent only if the Party
activity "was of a kind which is explainable on no other basis than
that [the defendant] personally intended to bring about the overthrow
of the Government as speedily as circumstances would permit." 13
This standard is substantially more exacting than the corresponding
rule in an ordinary criminal case, which permits conviction even if
possible inferences from the evidence were consistent with innocence,
so long as a jury could reasonably have concluded that guilt was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Hellman standard thus
prohibits, as a matter of federal free speech law, conclusions of a
nature that are ordinarily permitted in cases in which First Amend-
ment values are not threatened.
1 4
111. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
112. 298 F.2d at 812.
113. Id. at 813 (emphasis added). Similarly, defendant's own statements would not
suffice for a finding of proscribed specific intent if the statements were made in de-
fendant's "role [as] teacher of the Party line" or if the statements otherwise possessed any
ambiguity on the issue of defendant's intent. Id. at 813-14. For a less stringent interpreta-
tion of this aspect of the strictissimi juris rule, see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340, 380 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
114. The court's reversal of the conviction, after a careful review of the record, in-
dicates the extraordinarily restrictive power of its standard. Although the court acknowl-
edged that Hellman was an "exceedingly active member" of the Communist Party-
organizing, teaching, distributing literature, soliciting contributions-it held that this
activity did not "give rise to a reasonable inference that he specifically intended to over-
throw the Government by force and violence at the first propitious moment," since "the
activity portrayed is explainable on the basis that he intended to bring about the Party's
ultimate goals through peaceable means." 298 F.2d at 813 (emphasis added). The only
Party activities that could permissibly give rise to an inference of proscribed specific
intent were such unambiguous personal actions as "the collection of weapons and am-
munition in substantial quantities, or the conducting of field surveys to ascertain ways
and means of sabotaging public utility or defense plants." Id.
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The doctrine of Scales and Noto was further refined in United
States v. Spock,115 in which the defendants were convicted of con-
spiring to "counsel, aid and abet" Selective Service registrants in fail-
ing to retain draft cards and in obstructing the draft.110 Proof of the
alleged conspiracy rested on evidence that defendants had been in-
volved in activities protesting the Vietnam War and supporting draft
resisters.'" 7 In reviewing the convictions, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals found that if there had been a conspiracy, it was "a bifarious
undertaking, involving both legal and illegal conduct."' " In order
to assure that adherents intending solely to further the legal goals
of the undertaking were not penalized, the court imposed the fol-
lowing elaborate version of the strictissimi juris standard, which
stringently limits the jury's ordinary freedom to draw inferences
of specific intent:
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political with-
in the shadow of the First Amendment, we hold that an individ-
ual's specific intent to adhere to the illegal portions may be
shown in one of three ways: [1] by the individual defendant's
prior or subsequent unambiguous statements; [2] by the indi-
vidual defendant's subsequent commission of the very illegal act
contemplated by the agreement; or [3] by the individual de-
fendant's subsequent legal act if that act is "clearly undertaken
for the specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal
activity which is advocated." 9
In its elaboration of the strictissimi juris test, the Spock court thus
appears to go beyond restrictions on the sufficiency of the evidence to
impose special First Amendment limitations, not present in ordinary
conspiracy prosecutions, on the introduction and use of evidence. 120
115. 416 F.2d 165 (Ist Cir. 1969).
116. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1970).
117. 416 F.2d at 168.
118. Id. at 172.
119. Id. at 173 (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 234).
120. That the Spock court contemplated a special First Amendment rule of ex-
clusion is indicated by its treatment of evidence of statements of "third parties alleged
to be co-conspirators." This evidence was apparently introduced by the Government to
give rise to inferences concerning the specific intent of the defendants in adhering to the
alleged conspiracy. In an ordinary conspiracy trial, analogous evidence might have been
admissible under the doctrine that, if a conspiracy is found, acts and statements of some
co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy may be used to show intent of others.
Pinkerton v. United State, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (dictum); Wiborg v. United States, 163
U.S. 632, 657-58 (1896). The Spock court, however, ruled that introduction of these state-
ments on the issue of defendants' specific intent was "improper," since "[the specific
intent of one defendant in a case such as this is not ascertained by reference to the
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It is clear that a more stringent rule of exclusion regarding evi-
dence of protected speech and association would accord well with the
stricter First Amendment procedural rules imposed in related areas.
The importance of a special exclusionary rule is emphasized by the
particular risks posed by the jury in the context of First Amendment
adjudication.
It is widely acknowledged that, in general, the danger of lawless
decisionmaking by government is perhaps at its greatest when the
governmental agency involved is the jury. Distrust of the jury is per-
vasive. As Jerome Frank remarked, "I submit that the jury is the
worst possible enemy of this ideal of the 'supremacy of law.' For
'jury-made law' is, par excellence, capricious and arbitrary, yielding
the maximum in the way of lack of uniformity, of unknowability."'121
In addition to more general problems of jury accountability, special
dangers posed by the jury to First Amendment interests have frequent-
ly been noted. It has been pointed out that the jury generally represents
majoritarian interests often opposed to the views of unpopular political
minorities and, consequently, that the jury poses particular dangers in
conduct or statements of another even though he has knowledge thereof. . . . The
metastatic rules of ordinary conspiracy are at direct variance with the principle of
strictissimi juris." 416 F.2d at 173 (footnote omitted). Since a new trial was necessary on
other grounds, however, the court did not decide whether the improper admission or use
of this evidence would in itself have constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal. Id.
at 174. Furthermore, as one commentator has noted, evidence of third-party statements
might not be excluded under the Spock analysis if they were relevant to an element of
the offense other than defendant's intent. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amend-
ment, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 189, 224 & n.140 (1972).
Nevertheless, the rule of the Spock case seems to constitute a clear First Amendment
limitation on the introduction and use of evidence. Not only is evidence of the third
party's statements in itself insufficient for the purpose of establishing the defendant's
specific intent, it is impermissible for the jury to use it at all for that purpose. This is so
even though evidence of third party statements may well possess logical relevance on that
issue. If, for example, A joins a political "undertaking," knowing of statements of B (a
leader of that group) advocating that the group undertake certain illegal acts, the
probability of A's possession of proscribed specific intent would appear measurably in-
creased. Yet the court's prophylactic First Amendment rule seems to prohibit the introduc-
tion of B's statements for this purpose in a prosecution for conspiracy to undertake the
illegal acts. Rather, a finding of the defendant's specific intent must be based solely upon
the unambiguous acts or words of the specific defendant in question.
121. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 132 (1949). See generally Broeder, The Functions of
the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954); Sunderland, Verdicts, General
and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920). As a result of this distrust of the jury, courts have
created rules of exclusion to insulate the jury from evidence that, although relevant,
poses a substantial danger of misuse. Levin & Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Non-
jury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 905, 905-06 (1971). Although these exclusionary
rules also apply in form at least when the judge is the factfinder, their rigor is
frequently mitigated in civil cases tried by a judge alone. See generally Davis, Hearsay in
NVontjury Cases, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1970); Levin & Cohen, supra.
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cases in which the rights of those groups may be infringed. 12 Professor
Monaghan has commented, for example:
In general, any expansive conception of the jury's role is incon-
sistent with a vigorous application of the first amendment. Like
administrative agencies, the jury cannot be expected to be suf-
ficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests involved in
any given proceeding....
... Much of [the] present importance [of the first amendment]
lies in protecting unpopular speech, that of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Communists, fascists, radicals and the like. This development is
a matter of fundamental significance, and one which requires a
reevaluation of the assumption that the jury is a reliable fact-
finder in free speech cases. The jury may be an adequate re-
flector of the community's conscience, but that conscience is not
and never has been very tolerant of dissent.
... [Thus] despite the Court's expansive solicitude for the jury
in other contexts, first amendment considerations should be
read to confine, not expand, the jury's role.123
Expressions of distrust of the jury in the protection of First Amend-
ment rights may be found in cases involving the Supreme Court's
supervision of First Amendment rules limiting recovery for libel and
slander. In many of these cases the fear that a jury might covertly
censor disapproved speech has led to particularly stringent appellate
review of the evidence. 24 In other instances, distrust of the jury
has played a role in molding the substantive constitutional rule itself.
Justice Harlan, a particularly thoughtful analyst of the constitutional
law of libel, noted that distrust of the jury in the First Amendment
context constituted a foundation of the New York Times doctrine
itself:
122. Broeder, supra note 121, at 414 ("From the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts,
the government's attempted inroads on civil rights seem to have received the enthusiastic
support of jurors.") In a similar vein Professor Chafee remarked, "It is only in times of
popular panic and indignation that freedom of speech becomes important as an institu-
tion, and it is precisely in those times that the protection of the jury proves illusory." Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1941).
123. Monaghan, supra note 83, at 527-29 (footnotes omitted).
124. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971) (plurality
opinion) ("The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of 'constitutional fact'
compel this Court's de novo review.") Similarly, in reviewing Smith Act cases, courts
of appeals have a special responsibility to scrutinize the evidence and to apply "rigorous
standards of review." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 328 (1957). The Supreme Court,
moreover, itself ordered acquittals of certain defendants in Yates, id. at 328-31, and of
the defendant in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Dissenting in Yates, Justice
Clark remarked: "In its long history I find no case in which an acquittal has been
ordered by this Court solely on the facts." 354 U.S. at 346 (emphasis in original).
1658
Vol. 86: 1622, 1977
First Amendment Limitations on Evidence
[The Court recognized] that in many areas which are at the
center of public debate "truth" is not a readily identifiable con-
cept, and putting to the pre-existing prejudices of a jury the de-
termination of what is "true" may effectively institute a system of
censorship. Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of
its heritage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury
finding of falsity.125
Three other Justices argued in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
that a public official should never be permitted to collect libel damages
from a critic of his official conduct, even if the speaker's statement
was recklessly or knowingly false, since the jury cannot be relied upon
to apply the standard scrupulously. 12 6 In his concurring opinion in
New York Times, Justice Black argued that the Court's First Amend-
ment test for libel was "elusive" and "abstract" and that the jury's
award probably resulted from hostility toward the defendants. "This
record," continued Justice Black, "certainly does not indicate that any
different verdict would have been rendered here whatever the Court
had charged the jury about 'malice,' 'truth,' 'good motives,' 'justifiable
ends,' or any other legal formulas which in theory would protect the
press."' 27 The same concerns were expressed by Justice Douglas dis-
senting in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
The subject matter [of an allegedly libelous publication] in-
volved "Communist plots," "conspiracies against law enforcement
agencies," and the killing of a private citizen by the police. With
any such amalgam of controversial elements pressing upon the
jury, a jury determination, unpredictable in the most neutral
circumstances, becomes for those who venture to discuss heated
issues, a virtual roll of the dice separating them from liability
for often massive claims of damage.
. .. It matters little whether the standard be articulated as
"malice" or "reckless disregard of the truth" or "negligence," for
jury determinations by any of those criteria are virtually unre-
viewable. This Court, in its continuing delineation of variegated
mantles of First Amendment protection, is, like the potential
publisher, left with only speculation on how jury findings were
influenced by the effect the subject matter of the publication
had upon the minds and viscera of the jury.128
125. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
126. The three were Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg. See Monaghan, supra
note 83, at 527 & n.38.
127. 376 U.S. at 295. See also id. at 297-305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
128. 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (emphasis added).
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Although the position taken by Justices Black and Douglas has
not been accepted by the Court, the validity and strength of their
fears seem in large part to have been conceded sub silentio by the
extreme care with which the Court has itself reviewed jury verdicts
under the New York Times standard.1209 And precisely these concerns
over the danger of a jury's unreviewable penalization of protected
speech have played a part in the decision of the Court to restrict dam-
ages without actual loss in defamation actions' 3 ° and to limit the
granting of punitive damages for defamation. 13'
These considerations, powerful enough in the case of libel, are
even more compelling when unpopular but protected speech is en-
tered into evidence in the prosecution of a criminal defendant. 132
It thus seems clear that First Amendment doctrine should favor a
stringent rule of exclusion to prevent the unreviewable burdens that
juries in criminal prosecutions may impose on First Amendment
values.
III. The First Amendment Test
When viewed against the extensive procedural protection afforded
the First Amendment in other contexts, the defects in the present stan-
dard for the exclusion of prejudicial evidence seem substantial and
fundamental. The essential problem is that the current test, requiring
as it does that evidence be excluded only if its prejudicial force sub-
stantially outweighs its probative value,133 embodies a strong bias in
favor of the admissibility of evidence. Moreover, as Judge Weinstein
has recommended, courts generally apply the test in a manner favoring
admissibility.
1 34
Such an attitude may be appropriate when ordinary questions of
prejudice are at issue. When the risk of prejudice, however, is a risk
that First Amendment interests may be improperly penalized, the
129. See note 124 supra.
130. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
131. Id. at 350.
132. Improper use by the jury of evidence of protected speech or association in a
criminal case may result not merely in civil damages, as in libel and slander, but rather
in the most serious type of burden on First Amendment interests-the conviction of a
criminal defendant based on protected speech.
133. See p. 1627 & note 13 supra.
134. Id. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 403(03) (1976)
("Generally, the better approach on the question of admissibility is to view both proba-
tive force and prejudice most favorably towards the proponent, that is to say, to give the
evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prei-
udicial value.") See also Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 43, 79 (1969).
1660
Vol. 86: 1622, 1977
First Amendment Limitations on Evidence
application of such a standard contrasts sharply with the premise of
cases such as Speiser v. Randall,135 that particular pains must be taken
to insulate protected speech and association from impermissible
burdens.
A. The Nature of the First Amendment Test
Because such grave First Amendment risks are created when the
prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of protected speech against
a criminal defendant, it might be argued that evidence of protected
speech should be inadmissible in a criminal trial under all circum-
stances. 130 Such a rule would indeed make an unconstitutional convic-
tion impossible. In general, however, First Amendment prophylactic
rules are not applied with such absolute sweep. 137 Moreover, doctrine
in related First Amendment areas supports some degree ol accommo-
dation of permissible governmental interests. In enforcing the crim-
inal law against nonspeech offenses, the government is involved in
a traditional state function-the penalization of criminal conduct whose
definition does not turn on the content of speech. In achieving this
end, the state may use logically relevant evidence to give rise to per-
missible inferences of guilt. If evidence of protected speech is in-
troduced in the course of proving a nonspeech offense, however, the
enforcement of the criminal law may have the effect of "incidentally
limiting [the] unfettered exercise [of speech]," 13s since the defendant
may be penalized for his speech or future speech or may be chilled. In
such cases the First Amendment may require a "reconciliation"' 39
of the interests of the state and the defendant, rather than a flat exclu-
sionary rule that would always deny the government the use of
permissible inferences derived from evidence of protected speech, re-
gardless of the strength of those inferences and regardless of the re-
moteness of the danger that impermissible inferences might be drawn.
Such a reconciliation, however, must take account of the fact that
introduction of the defendant's protected expression poses severe
dangers to First Amendment rights and that other governmental in-
terests must often give way to the procedural protection of First
Amendment values. Consequently, to guard against the risk that ex-
135. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
136. See, e.g., Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 894-95
(1970) (protected public expression should be excluded in conspiracy prosecutions).
137. For example, overly broad statutes affecting speech are constitutional if the
degree of overbreadth is not "substantial" under the circumstances. Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
138. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961).
139. Id. at 51.
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pression protected by the First Amendment will be used impermissibly
to penalize a criminal defendant, evidence of a defendant's protected
speech or association should be excluded, when offered by the gov-
ernment, unless the government can establish that the probative value
of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial dangers. This
standard, which reverses the ordinary test and imposes a heavy burden
on the government, would afford substantial protection to First
Amendment interests. Yet the standard would also permit the gov-
ernment to use such evidence if the permissible inferences to be
drawn from the evidence are extremely strong and if the introduction
of the evidence is essential to proof of an offense that is not itself
based on protected speech.
B. Parallel Tests in Legislative and Other Investigations
The use of a test that imposes a heavy burden of justification on
the government would parallel developments in the law of legisla-
tive investigations and related areas, in which First Amendment values
have overridden the interest of the government in obtaining infor-
mation about an individual's protected speech or association. Cases
in the 1950s and early 1960s used a balancing test that gave presump-
tive weight to governmental interests in obtaining disclosure of pro-
tected speech and association.1 4 0 But more recent cases have insulated
witnesses from forced disclosure of protected association in opinions
in which language requiring the showing of a "compelling" govern-
mental interest has been prominent.14' As Professor Emerson has
stated,
more likely, the balancing test as a whole has undergone trans-
formation as the Court has come to give greater weight to the
140. E.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961) (refusal to answer questions
about Communist Party membership); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961)
(same); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (same); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959) (refusal to disclose names of guests at summer camp suspected of connection
with "subversive activities").
141. E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
(NAACP official protected in refusing to refer to membership records to determine
whether individuals supposedly affiliated with Communist Party were also members of
NAACP). See also DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (witness protected in
refusing to discuss Communist Party activities six years earlier); Pollard v. Roberts, 283
F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), af'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (disclosure of contributors
to Arkansas Republican Party protected against subpoena by prosecutor investigating
purchasing of votes).
"Compelling interest" language was also used by the Court in decisions insulating the
anonymity of NAACP membership at a time when Communist Party affiliations were
subjected to disclosure under a balancing test more lenient to the government. Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
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First Amendment side of the balance. In any event the balancing
test has taken the form of requiring the government to show a
"subordinating" interest that is "compelling." In this version the
test comes close to putting the burden of persuasion on the gov-
ernment and establishing a presumption in favor of First Amend-
ment rights.
1 42
A "compelling interest" test that places a substantial burden on the
government has also been used to insulate protected speech and as-
sociation from grand jury inquiries. In Bursey v. United States,
143
the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment protected staff mem-
bers of a Black Panther newspaper from disclosing information about
the organization of the newspaper, even though that information may
have been useful to a grand jury investigating threats to assassinate
the President and other crimes. The court of appeals squarely re-
jected the Government's assertion that the First Amendment possesses
no effective force in grand jury proceedings144 and, striking the con-
stitutional balance, pitched the applicable test sharply against the
Government. "When governmental activity collides with First Amend-
ment rights, the Government has the burden of establishing that its
interests are legitimate and compelling and that the incidental in-
fringement upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is es-
sential to vindicate its subordinating interests."'
145
Although the court acknowledged that the Government had a "com-
142. T. EazERsoN, supra note 4, at 275.
It seems clear that the First Amendment interest is, if anything, stronger when pro-
tected speech or association is sought to be used against a defendant in a criminal trial
than it is in the case of forced disclosure of political views before a legislative com-
mittee. In the latter case, the First Amendment interest lies in insulating the witness or
persons named by the witness from "public stigma, scorn and obloquy" based on the
nature of their views or associations, and in avoiding the "more subtle and immeasurable"
dampening effect that forced disclosure may have on others. Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). Both of those dangers are present when evidence of a defendant's
views is introduced in a criminal trial, in addition to the more serious danger that the
jury may use those views impermissibly to convict the defendant. Thus the increased
strength of the First Amendment interest offsets what may be argued to be the govern-
ment's greater interest in convicting a criminal defendant.
143. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
144. Id. at 1082.
145. Id. at 1083.
The court stated further:
When the collision occurs in the context of a grand jury investigation, the Govern-
ment's burden is not met unless it establishes that the Government's interest in the
subject matter of the investigation is "immediate, substantial, and subordinating,"
that there is a "substantial connection" between the information it seeks to have the
witness compelled to supply and the overriding governmental interest in the subject
matter of the investigation, and that the means of obtaining the information is not
more drastic than necessary to forward the asserted governmental interest.
Id.
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pelling interest" in the general subject of the investigation,146 it im-
posed a more rigorous form of scrutiny, in effect requiring that the
Government show a compelling need for the specific information
sought by the question at issue: "[t]he fact alone that the Government
has a compelling interest in the subject matter of a grand jury inves-
tigation does not establish that it has any compelling need for the
answers to any specific questions."',47 Applying this test, the court
found that the Government had failed to carry its burden with re-
spect to certain questions about the personnel and organization of
the Black Panther newspaper1 48 and about the foreign travel of mem-
bers of the Black Panther Party.149 Bursey thus recognized a First
Amendment privilege that insulates evidence of protected speech and
association from disclosure before a grand jury unless the government
can overcome a substantial adverse presumption.150
As in the case of legislative investigations, the First Amendment in-
terests favoring exclusion of a defendant's protected speech at trial
seem substantially stronger than the interests favoring exclusion of
similar material from consideration by the grand jury. The risk of
an improper conviction based on protected speech places a signifi-
cantly heavier burden on First Amendment interests than the risk
146. Id. at 1086.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 1087.
149. Id. at 1088.
150. In a case decided after the initial opinion in Bursey, the Supreme Court rejected
arguments that the First Amendment insulated certain reporters from testifying before
grand juries. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). However, several distinctions
between the claim rejected in Branzburg and the First Amendment limitation proposed
here should be noted. In Branzburg the reporters asserted a First Amendment privilege
against testifying before grand juries even about criminal acts that they saw being
committed. The First Amendment limitations on trial testimony proposed here concern
only evidence of the defendant's protected speech or association, where much different
First Amendment interests are at issue. Furthermore, Branzburg rested in part on the
Court's unwillingness to create a First Amendment privilege based on the status of the
individual asserting it-a privilege belonging only to news-gatherers and not to others,
408 U.S. at 703-05-together with the fear that such a privilege would create "a private
system of informers operated by the press to report on criminal conduct," which would
be "unaccountable to the public" and protected by "a virtually impenetrable constitu-
tional shield." Id. at 697. These objections, of course, are inapplicable to the rule pro-
posed here. Finally, the First Amendment interest to be protected here is the defendant's
powerful interest in not being punished for his own protected speech or association, rather
than the less differentiated, less immediate, and less personal interest of reporters in
protecting what is perceived to be the flow of news to others.
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Branzburg, the Government petitioned for
rehearing in Bursey; the Government argued that the Court had undercut the basis of
the First Amendment privilege asserted in Bursey. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,
1090 (9th Cir. 1972). The court of appeals rejected the Government's position, and noted
substantial distinctions between the First Amendment rights recognized in Bursey and the
privilege rejected in Branzburg. Id. at 1090-91.
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of governmental harassment taking uncertain forms, which was the
burden apparently feared in Bursey. Even if the risk in disclosure
before the grand jury is thought to be improper indictment on the
basis of protected speech, that danger, although severe, is of course
not as serious as improper conviction based on protected speech.' 5
C. The Application of the First Amendment Test
Several additional aspects of the evidentiary test proposed here re-
quire mention. In the application of the test at trial, the initial focus
must be on the issue of possible First Amendment prejudice. Thus
in order for the test to be applicable at all, there must be some danger
that prejudice arising from the admission of evidence of the defen-
dant's protected speech or association will violate the defendant's
First Amendment rights. This point is worth noting because, in a
certain sense, almost any statement of a criminal defendant is "pro-
tected" by the First Amendment. That is, if A says to B, "I hate C"
or "I shot C," the First Amendment ordinarily protects A from being
punished for having made those statements: the speaking of those
words could not, in itself, be made a crime. Nonetheless, B may or-
dinarily testify at the trial of A for allegedly shooting C that A made
those statements.'0 2 The test proposed here, however, would have no
application in these instances, since there is no substantial chance
that the defendant's First Amendment rights would be prejudiced-
that is to say, no substantial chance that the protected speech itself
would be punished or that impermissibly strong inferences would be
drawn from evidence of the speech.' 53 Since the purpose of the test
is the protection of First Amendment rights, however, the court should
151. Further, of course, the interest in associational anonymity is partially protected in
grand jury proceedings-associations are revealed to the government, but ordinarily not
to the public at large-whereas testimony at trial will result in public revelation of
political associations. It should also be noted that, in a number of constitutional areas,
rules of admissibility in a criminal trial are substantially more restrictive than rules
concerning the admissibility of the same evidence before a grand jury. E.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (illegally seized evidence, inadmissible at
trial, may permissibly be introduced before a grand jury).
152. In the first example ("I hate C"), the evidence may be admissible for the
purpose of showing A's state of mind (hatred of C) from which the act of shooting C
might be inferred; in the second example ("I shot C"), the statement is an admission of
the act itself.
153. Without more, there is no substantial likelihood that the jury may punish
people who say "I hate C" or "I shot C" merely for having said those words or even, in
the situation posed in the first example, for hating C. In the second example C'I shot
C"), the possibility that a jury may give a defendant's confession more weight than it
should be given-for example, because of coercive interrogation or unusual suggestibility
of the defendant-raises separate problems of due process or compulsory self-incrimination.
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give the defendant substantial leeway in asserting the possibility of
First Amendment prejudice, and, in a reversal of Judge Weinstein's
suggestion, 54 the possibility of prejudice should be assessed at its
maximum reasonable value. 155 Since political speech is at the core of
the First Amendment, the permissible interest of the government in
introducing such evidence should be determined with the most scru-
pulous exactitude.
Once it is shown that there is a risk of First Amendment prejudice,
how should the test be applied? First, it will be necessary to be clear
on the proposed use of the evidence. Unlike the process employed
in Rosenberg, the trial court should indicate with consistency and
clarity the precise logical relationship between the evidence in question
and the specific element or elements of the offense to which the evi-
dence is relevant. Further, the court should analyze the strength of the
inference to be drawn from the evidence to the element or elements of
the offense in question and then decide whether the government's
interest in introducing the evidence for this permissible purpose sub-
stantially outweighs the risk of First Amendment prejudice presented.
If there is any substantial danger of prejudice to First Amendment
interests, the evidence should be excluded unless the permissible in-
ference from the evidence is extremely strong-since otherwise the
probative value would not substantially outweigh the danger of prej-
udice.1 (6 Since limiting or corrective instructions are ineffective as
a prophylactic technique, evidence of protected speech or association
not meeting the First Amendment test must be excluded-that is, ac-
tually withheld from the jury-rather than admitted subject to any
sort of limiting instruction.157
154. See p. 1660 & note 134 supra.
155. Although the assessment of prejudice in the relevant community ordinarily in-
volves a form of judicial notice, the defendant should be permitted to introduce specific
evidence of prejudice if necessary.
156. Furthermore, in determining the probative value of the evidence, the court
should consider the extent to which the government can establish the point in question
by means that do not endanger First Amendment interests. Under the proposed test, as
under traditional tests, the probative value of evidence to be weighed against prejudicial
dangers should be the "incremental probative value"-that is, the probative value added
by the disputed evidence to that of nonprejudicial evidence present in the case. See,
e.g., Dolan, supra note 13, at 250-53. If the point can be substantially proved by non-
prejudicial evidence, the incremental probative value of the evidence of protected ex-
pression would be significantly diminished.
157. In light of the severe dangers of prejudice presented, and in light of the fact
that instructions to the jury to disregard prejudicial evidence are ordinarily ineffective,
it seems likely that certain ancillary procedural changes may be necessary in order to
assure effective administration of the First Amendment test at trial. Even the prejudice
caused by asking a question about the defendant's protected speech or association should
be avoided, notwithstanding the fact that if the defendant's objection to the question is
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Finally, when reviewing exercises of the proposed test, appellate
courts should abandon the broad deference ordinarily granted to the
determination of a trial judge in admitting or excluding evidence.
Rather, since First Amendment rights are threatened, the reviewing
court should make its own independent determination of whether
the test is met. The appellate court should reverse if it finds that
the government's permissible interest in the admission of the evi-
dence does not substantially outweigh the danger of First Amendment
prejudice. This de novo review would resemble the heightened stan-
dard of evidentiary review under the strictissimi juris doctrine in Smith
Act and similar litigation,'5 8 and would also parallel the Court's prac-
tice of directly reviewing factual determinations upon which First
Amendment and other constitutional rights depend.159
Even with a careful and articulate balancing of probative value
and prejudical danger, however, the proposed evidentiary test is sub-
ject to flexibility in application, which poses dangers to the protection
of First Amendment interests. 60 Although the test places a substantial
burden on the government, the determination of whether the burden
is met depends upon an assessment of numerous disparate factors, and
the weight to be accorded each factor may vary widely in accordance
with the personal judgment of individuals. Thus although the test
contemplates a balancing in each case, it may be valuable to outline
with greater specificity some suggestions concerning the manner in
which the balance might ordinarily be struck with respect to certain
common classes of inferences drawn from evidence of speech or as-
sociation. The following discussion is not intended as a detailed
code, but rather as a set of guidelines indicating the manner in
sustained, the information will not be introduced. A similar danger of prejudice is
presented by a prosecutor's reference to evidence of protected speech or association in
an opening statement if the evidence is later held to be inadmissible at trial. It may
therefore be necessary to employ procedural rules that require disclosure before trial of
the prosecution's intention to introduce evidence of defendant's political speech or as-
sociation, in order to obtain a pretrial ruling on the extent to which such evidence may
be admissible. This technique may involve a greater use of pretrial practice than is
customary in criminal litigation in many jurisdictions, and may also have the effect of
requiring the government to reveal more information about the nature of its case than
may presently be required under typical criminal discovery rules. Here, as elsewhere,
First Amendment imperatives should require the construction of special procedural rules
in order fully to safeguard "substantive" First Amendment rights.
158. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
159. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
160. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 720 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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which the specific problems set forth below should ordinarily be
approached.161
1. Inferences from defendant's speech to his state of mind or action.
The inference from an individual's speech to his subsequent action
is often weak. Generally such an inference requires an intermediate
inference as to the speaker's state of mind: the sequence proceeds
from (1) the words of the speaker, to (2) an inference that the speaker
possessed a certain state of mind, to (3) the further inference that
the speaker acted in accordance with that state of mind. If a court
admits A's statement, "I intend to kill B," for the purpose of showing
that A killed B, the jury must draw an inference from the words to
the fact that A actually intended to kill B (since it is possible that A
was joking or exaggerating), and from that intention to the fact that
A killed B. The latter inference may be the most difficult, since the
performance of intended acts frequently does not occur.
In the foregoing example, the inference from the defendant's speech
to his action is arguably at its strongest, since the first inferential
step, from words to intention, is as clear as it can be made. The in-
ference is substantially more problematic if the defendant's statement
is not an assertion that he possesses the intention to perform the very
act in question. If A's statement is "I hate B," for example, the in-
ference is substantially more tenuous. We still have the problem of
inferring a state of mind ("hatred") from the words. Does A really
"hate" B, or was he merely exaggerating a momentary annoyance?
Here also, however, the jury must then proceed to infer A's intention
to kill B from A's "hatred" of B. This is the more difficult step, be-
cause the jury has no clear indication of what "hatred" means to this
161. Although these suggestions are not offered as absolute per se rules, it is possible
that the suggested results will so often be correct that the loss of flexibility in their
adoption will be outweighed by the greater certainty that First Amendment interests will
be protected in judicial decisions. A similar judgment, for example, may well underlie
the application of the per se rules of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as
evidentiary safeguards for Fifth Amendment rights. Although the case-by-case determina-
tion of "voluntariness" may have most closely reflected tse "true" Fifth Amendment test
for confessions, the perceived likelihood that courts were erroneously admitting as "volun-
tary" a significant number of "involuntary" confessions may have led in part to the
creation of prophylactic per se rules intended to reduce the number of Fifth Amend-
ment violations through a test that could be administered with greater ease and clarity
by appellate courts. See Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MiC. L. Rev. 59,
94-104 (1966); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1975). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (case-by-case balancing in review of libel judgments rejected be-
cause "this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and
it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable").
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particular individual and therefore must be unclear on the strength of
the inference from "hatred" of B to intention to kill B.1
0 2
The difficulty is greatly exacerbated when the words from which
an inference of action is to be drawn constitute political speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment, particularly general political com-
mentary on governmental systems or forms. The basic problem lies
in the remoteness of the inference from general political commentary
to the performance of a specific illegal act and in the peculiar dan-
gers of prejudice arising from the introduction of such a statement
when the political views in question are offensive to majority opinion.
Suppose, to adapt an example from the Rosenberg case, the de-
fendant in an espionage case has said, "I prefer the form of govern-
ment of the Soviet Union to the form of government of the United
States." Such a statement concerning political forms tells us very little
about the speaker's intention to commit espionage on behalf of the
Soviet Union. The inference is particularly weak because the speech
of the defendant is commentary on political affairs. Since political
speech is frequently exaggerated and polemical in quality, 63 the
initial inference from the words to a state of mind (the actual pref-
erence for the form of government of the Soviet Union) may be
particularly tenuous. As noted above there is the additional problem
of drawing an inference from the defendant's preference for a certain
form of government to his preference for the nation possessing that
form of government. 164 There is then the further difficulty of inferring
a fully formed intention to commit espionage for that country and
the final problem of inferring action from such an intention. This
is not to say that the evidence of such political statements is not
relevant to show action, but rather that the inference from speech to
action is weak in general and particularly weak when the inference to
be drawn is from general political speech to illegal action. Even though
the inference from general political views to action is weak, it is likely
to be endowed with undue strength in times of political stress by
those who equate unorthodox statements with treasonous or seditious
intent. 0 5
162. In this instance, of course, the same problems also remain with respect to the
inference from the state of mind (intention of killing B) to the act itself.
163. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). See also T. EimE.RSoN, supra note 4, at 125 ("The
language of politics is filled with terms borrowed from the field of battle and violence,
and careful distinction between symbolic and realistic expression, uttered in the heat of
controversy, might not be drawn.")
164. See p. 1636 & note 41 supra.
165. When a defendant's prior speech is described in court by a witness, another
significant problem arises. Not only is it possible that the jury will draw an unduly
strong inference of action from the defendant's words, as reported by the witness, but
1669
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1622, 1977
In consequence, statements of a defendant's general political views
or preferences-particularly statements concerning political systems or
forms-should ordinarily be inadmissible for the purpose of giving
rise to an inference that the defendant committed certain acts sup-
posedly in consonance with those views. This should especially be the
result so long as there is any substantial hostility in the community
toward the views in question. Although the statements may have some
probative value for the purpose offered, the inference is tenuous and
remote and rarely sufficient to override the severe prejudicial dangers
arising from the disclosure of unpopular views.
It is possible, however, that in some instances more narrowly fo-
cused and specific statements, bearing on a possible intention to act,
may have substantially more probative value than statements of gen-
eral political views. Such statements, therefore, may not necessarily
be excluded under the guideline proposed here, even though they are
perhaps prompted by general political views. In assessing the admis-
sibility of speech on the question of a defendant's action, it may thus
be necessary to draw a line separating general political views from
views of greater specificity bearing on the alleged offense.166
Somewhat wider scope might also be given to the use of evidence
of a defendant's protected speech for the sole purpose of showing his
also the witness himself may be influenced by the unorthodox nature of the views ex-
pressed and thus may be led to exaggerate the specific evil of the language lie has heard.
The witness, however, may be completely unaware of his own uncertainties or exaggera-
tions.
166. Thus in a prosecution for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, statements
that the defendant prefers the Soviet form of government should ordinarily be excluded.
However, statements that any steps are justifiable to further the goals of the Soviet Union
might not necessarily be excluded under the position suggested here. Similarly, in the
prosecution of defendants for the alleged random shooting of white people, the de-
fendants' remarks that white people are oppressors and "devils" should ordinarily be
excluded, as general political statements. On the other hand, statements by defendants
approving violence against white people may not necessarily be excluded under the
proposed test even if the statements constitute protected speech.
Due to the problem of accurately reporting precisely what the defendant has said, the
First Amendment test should require that the contents of such specific statements of
intention be established by particularly convincing proof. The test might require, for
example, that the defendant's statements have been made in written form, or that a
witness testifying to oral statements have some particularly persuasive reason for remem-
bering the precise form of words that was used. Another variable that must be taken
into account in applying the test in this area is the possibility that language that appears
to be of greater specificity bearing on the alleged offense may actually be little more
than exaggerated rhetoric, in reality reflecting general political views rather than the
intent apparently set forth in the language. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969). In the application of the test, therefore, the court must assess whether or not
the defendant's statements were made under circumstances in which they appear to be a
literal reflection of the defendant's actual state of mind. Thus, remarks made in the
excitement of a large public rally may have less weight in this connection than the same
comments made deliberately in a small private gathering.
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intent as a separate element of the offense. Thus, when the perfor-
mance of an act has been conceded by the defendant and when the
case turns on the question of the intent with which the act was per-
formed, the government might be able to show an overriding interest
in the use of evidence of protected speech to establish such intent,
even though it would not have been permitted to use such evidence
to give rise to an inference that the defendant committed the act in
question. The inference from speech to intent is a much stronger in-
ference than the inference from speech to action, since in the former
instance fewer inferential steps are necessary and the difficult step
from intent to action is not at issue.167 Greater liberality in proof
of intent might also be premised on the difficulty of inferring in-
tent from ambiguous acts when intent is an essential element of
the offense. 168 No one can read the mind of the actor, and speech
is often the only (or at least the clearest) evidence bearing on the
question of intent. Acts exist in the physical world and thus are
more clearly susceptible of external proof. 69
167. Similarly, evidence of other crimes has traditionally been admitted more freely
to show that defendant possessed a certain state of mind than to show that defendant
committed a certain act. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666, 198 S.W.2d 969
(1947). Even when proving intent alone, however, it should be remembered that the
dangers of First Amendment prejudice may be severe. Further, any more liberal use of
such evidence to show intent (as a separate element of the offense) should generally be
limited to instances in which the performance of the act has been conceded by the de-
fendant. If the evidence were introduced for the purpose of showing intent alone in a
case in which the defendant's performance of the act was also at issue, the jury would
most likely use the evidence to give rise to the more questionable inference of action,
regardless of any limiting instructions. In such a case, therefore, the evidence should not
be admitted on the question of intent unless the government can show that the First
Amendment test is also met with respect to the Government's proposed use of the
evidence on the issue of defendant's action. Also, wider scope for proof of intent should
not be permitted in conspiracy prosecutions, where the entire offense may be cast in
terms of intent and where the looseness of the definition of the offense tends to place
First Amendment interests at a substantial disadvantage. See generally Filvaroff, Con-
spiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 198-201, 250-53 (1972); Note,
conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
168. Compare, e.g., the traditional hearsay exception granting wide admissibility to
evidence of a declarant's statements when used to prove his intent or other state of mind.
FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
169. A useful example of evidence used to show intent is suggested by Professor
Emerson, who remarks that "a speech urging the blocking of traffic on a bridge in
protest of the Vietnam war might be introduced in proof of the state of mind of the
speaker when his car later stalled on the bridge." T. E.mERSO., supra note 4, at 406.
Under the analysis suggested here, evidence of this speech might possibly be admitted,
even if constitutionally protected, as the government may have an overriding interest in
the introduction of the evidence to show intent in light of its high probative value on
that issue, resulting from the specificity of the remarks. This argument might perhaps
also apply to remarks that were not quite so clearly exhortations-such as public state-
ments that "this war will only be ended if roads and bridges are shut down." It should
be noted, however, that this evidence is nonetheless suspect, even if used for the purpose
of showing intent only and the First Amendment test must, at any rate, be applied to
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2. Inferences from the speech of a third person to defendant's state
of mind or action. On occasion the prosecution may seek to introduce
evidence of the protected speech of a third person or persons in or-
der to give rise to an inference that the defendant possessed a certain
intent or performed certain illegal actions. The prosecution, for ex-
ample, may seek to impute to the defendant the views of a book
that he has read or that he possesses-either through independent
evidence or as an inference from the fact of possession itself-to give
rise to the further inference that the defendant acted in accordance
with ideas expressed in the work.170 In this instance the introduction
of the evidence of protected speech may infringe the First Amendment
rights of the defendant as a member of the "audience,' '17 ' rather
than the defendant's rights as speaker, although the two rights are
most sensibly viewed as two aspects of the more general right of
freedom of thought or belief.172 Clearly, however, a defendant's First
Amendment rights are violated if he is convicted on the basis of im-
permissible inferences drawn from the ideas contained in books he
has read or movies he has seen.
173
The inference from a third person's speech to the action of the
defendant is, in general, substantially more tenuous than the infer-
ence from the defendant's own speech to his action. If, for example,
evidence is introduced that the defendant read or possessed a book
containing statements urging violence against policemen, the infer-
ence that the defendant took certain action, such as assaulting a
policeman, is substantially more remote than the inference to be
drawn from the defendant's own statements urging or endorsing such
violence. Even if the work contains such exhortations to action, its
probative force must rest on the difficult inference that the defendant
the specific circumstances of the trial. For example, if the state has other evidence of
the defendant's intent, not in the form of political speech-such as the defendant's
obstruction of policemen in their attempts to move the car-the evidence of protected
speech might be excluded due to its diminished incremental probative value. See note
156 supra.
170. See note 4 supra (introduction of film and books in Panther 21 and Angela
Davis trials).
171. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
172. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. Prejudicial uses of such evidence parallel improper uses of evidence of a de-
fendant's own speech. For example, the jury may wish to punish a defendant for reading
the literature in question (and, by implication, for having the interests and beliefs sug-
gested by the literature), totally apart from any relation between the literature and the
offense for which the defendant is being charged. Further, a jury may irrationally infer
that anyone who reads particular literature is likely to have committed crimes in gen-
eral, or may improperly endow a tenable but remote inference from literature to a
reader's action with a strength that the inference cannot rationally be found to possess.
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was persuaded by the particular statements in question, out of all
statements in the book, and in effect adopted as his own the intent
revealed in the exhortation. Frequently, however, people read litera-
ture containing views with which they do not agree for the purposes
of study, refutation, or curiosity.
When the statements in the work or speech of another are general
political remarks rather than narrow and focused exhortations, the
inference becomes even more dubious. The jury must then infer not
only that the defendant agreed with the statements, but also that the
general political views thus revealed led the defendant to conceive
an intention to perform a specific act, an inference which, as we have
seen, is very difficult to draw from general political language, even
when the language is the language of the defendant and not of some
third person.
Even though the inference is in reality exceedingly remote, how-
ever, the possession of unpopular literature may well lead to sub-
stantial prejudice in the form of unduly strong inferences of crim-
inality. If there is any substantial risk of prejudice, therefore, the
First Amendment should ordinarily be held to prohibit any inference
to a defendant's state of mind or action drawn from evidence that
he read or possessed a particular work pertaining to public affairs.
If there is clear extrinsic evidence that a defendant adopted a specific
statement of a third person as his own, the statement should then be
considered under the guidelines for evidence of a defendant's own
statements, set forth above.
3. Inferences from defendant's political association. The introduc-
tion of evidence of a defendant's political association to give rise to
an inference of his state of mind or action can be viewed as a special
and more complicated instance of the introduction of statements of
third persons for the same purpose. Evidence of political association
is ordinarily introduced to impute to the defendant certain tenets of
the association, as articulated by persons other than the defendant.
The evidence might then give rise to the further inference that the
defendant possessed a certain intent supposedly in accordance with
those tenets and perhaps that the defendant acted in accordance with
that intent. 74 As with any use of third party statements to draw an
174. The basic problem is two-fold: first, there is the question whether statements of
specified third parties can be attributed to the organization; second, even if the organiza-
tion can be said to possess certain tenets, there is the question whether, or to what
extent, the tenets can be attributed to the defendant. The Supreme Court has stressed
analytical difficulties inherent in imputing the views of third persons to a specified
1673
The Yale Law Journal
inference as to defendant's own intent or action, the basic question
concerns the extent to which it may be concluded that the defendant
has adopted the third party's tenets as his own. Of course one ordinarily
joins a political organization because of agreement with some of its
tenets. But courts have recognized that political parties and other
political groups that possess some illegal goals often also possess legal
goals and that a member of such a group may intend to further its
legal goals only.175 If, as the court of appeals assumed in United States
v. Rosenberg, evidence of Communist Party membership is introduced
to give rise to an inference that the defendant committed acts of
espionage,176 the jury is permitted to draw an inference of illegal in-
tent (and, hence, of illegal action) when the defendant may have
belonged to the party solely with the intention of furthering its legal
goals. In light of the ambiguity inherent in membership in a group
that possesses both legal and illegal goals, the inference from mem-
bership to illegal intent or action may be weak. Furthermore, when
the organization is highly unpopular there is serious danger that in-
ferences of a member's intent to further the illegal goals of the
organization will be drawn with undue strength.
The application of the First Amendment test must therefore focus
on the extent to which the evidence of associational membership is
ambiguous. When a group possesses substantial legal goals, evidence
of membership, with little more, would often be highly ambiguous on
the question of defendant's illegal intent. The evidence would thus
possess relatively little probative value on the question of the de-
fendant's state of mind or propensity for illegal action. Highly
ambiguous evidence ordinarily would not substantially outweigh the
prejudicial dangers presented by evidence of connection with an ex-
tremely unpopular organization.
It is conceivable, however, that the Government, through the in-
troduction of additional evidence about the organization, might show
a very high likelihood that each member of the organization adheres
to the illegal goals, in which case the probative value of evidence of
association to show a defendant's intent to achieve those goals might
rise to the requisite level. Nevertheless, such a course poses its own
organization, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), and has also cast doubt
on the permissibility of inferring a defendant's individual beliefs and intent from the
tenets of an organization with which he may be associated, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937).
175. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,
169 (Ist Cir. 1969).
176. See pp. 1634-35 supra.
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serious dangers to First Amendment interests. In proving such a
general proposition about the membership of an organization of any
size or complexity, introduction of the amount of evidence necessary
to make an adequate showing might well shift the focus of the trial
from the specific offense charged to a more general consideration of
the nature of the group itself.177 This would multiply prejudicial dan-
gers and would risk misleading the jury into believing that the charge
against the defendant is proved upon a finding that the organization
possesses the goals charged. As a result of these twin dangers, the
First Amendment test might be found to preclude the use of as-
sociational membership when the prejudicial danger presented by
the evidence is high and when the organization is of substantial size
and possesses significant legal goals in addition to its alleged illegal
goals.178 Such a conclusion would not necessarily prevent introduction
of evidence of specific statements or activities of the defendant him-
177. Such a showing about any but the smallest organizations would presumably re-
quire more evidence than the cursory views of a single witness, such as the testimony
of Elizabeth Bentley in United States v. Rosenberg. See p. 1637 supra.
It might be argued that general evidence of strict discipline within the organization is
a sufficient addition to evidence of defendant's membership to permit an inference that
defendant was prepared to accomplish, and may have acted to accomplish, any of the
goals of the organization, including its illegal goals. In a case in which there is direct
evidence showing the amenability of the specific defendant to such discipline, this
argument might have some force. But where the only evidence is general testimony as to
discipline exercised within the group or specific testimony as to discipline exercised over
individuals other than the defendant, the evidence again requires an inference not from
defendant's own words or acts to his intent, but rather from the words and activities of
third parties to the defendant's intent. The same problems of ambiguity are raised, since
there is no direct showing that defendant's specific relationship with the organization
is the same as any other individual's relationship; that is, that he, like certain others,
is amenable to discipline.
178. A flat prohibition of the use of evidence of association to show intent to
further the illegal goals of the organization might be implied by the opinion of the
court in United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). As discussed above, see p.
1656 and note 120 supra, the court in Spock considered defendants' participation in a
"bifarious undertaking," one possessing both legal and illegal goals, and found that it
was "improper" to introduce the views of other members of the "undertaking" for the
purpose of showing the defendants' proscribed intent. 416 F.2d at 173. It is arguable that
the strictissimni juris principle, as refined in Spock, should be viewed as a prohibition
against drawing any inference of illegal from evidence of defendant's membership in a
"bifarious" undertaking, even if accompanied by evidence of the illegal goals of certain
other members. Rather, only direct evidence that the defendant, as an individual, favored
the illegal goals of the organization would be permitted. In any kind of litigation, it
might be argued, the inference from a bifarious association to a specific member's illegal
intent violates First Amendment values since the risk of a burden on rights of asscoiation
is unacceptably high if there is any real possibility that the inference from membership to
illegal intent may be erroneous. Furthermore, if Spock thus implies that an inference of
defendant's illegal intent cannot permissibly be drawn from evidence of "bifarious"
membership, it should a fortiori be impermissible to allow an inference of defendant's
act to be drawn from such evidence, since the inference from membership to an illegal
act requires, as a preliminary step, the drawing of the prohibited inference from mem-
bership to an intention to accomplish the illegal goals of the enterprise.
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self, made or undertaken in connection with membership in a political
group, which would give rise to an inference of the defendant's own
specific intent.
17 9
Two final points should be noted with respect to the general ap-
plication of this First Amendment test. First, the constitutional right
at issue is a right of the defendant and can be waived. Consequently,
if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence of his own political
speech or association, nothing in the proposed test would prohibit
him from doing so. It should be understood, however, that the de-
fendant's introduction of such evidence might result in permitting
the prosecution to introduce rebutting evidence of the defendant's
speech or association, which might otherwise have been inadmissible.'8 s
The defendant's introduction of evidence of his protected expression
might increase the need for the introduction by the government of
its rebutting evidence, a need that did not exist in such compelling
form before the defendant's introduction of his evidence. Even under
such circumstances, however, care must be taken to limit the amount
of evidence that the prosecution is permitted to introduce on this
point and also to limit the purpose for which evidence of speech or
association might be introduced by the government. The defendant's
introduction of certain evidence of protected speech or association
should not be held to permit the prosecution to introduce evidence
of protected speech or association for purposes extending beyond the
purpose for which such evidence was introduced by the defendant.
Further, it should be noted that although the discussion in this
article has been limited to the introduction of evidence of protected
speech or association in the proof of a nonspeech offense, the same
principles should generally be applicable in prosecutions of defendants
for incitements or other allegedly unprotected speech. In such pros-
ecutions, of course, the speech that is alleged to be unprotected must
be introduced into evidence, since it is the central focus of the prose-
179. Nor would such a result necessarily exclude evidence of specific instructions to
commit illegal actions given to the defendant in the organizational context, under cir-
cumstances in which it seemed clear that the defendant, as an individual, accepted the
instructions. Clearly in such instances the probative value of the evidence is high and
its capacity to mislead the jury is relatively low.
180. A defendant charged with murder might introduce evidence showing that his
religious beliefs forbade killing. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 9, 1976, at 16, col. 1 (persons
accused of murdering FBI agents inform jury of tenet of their religion forbidding mur-
der). But see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1977)
(evidence that murder defendant belonged to religious sect that professes nonviolence
excluded as improper character evidence under FED. R. EvIo. 405(a)). If such evidence
is introduced, the government might not be prohibited from introducing contrary
evidence with respect to the religious doctrine in question.
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cution.18' In some instances, however, the government may seek to
introduce evidence of clearly protected speech or association in addi-
tion to the arguably unprotected speech for which the defendant is
actually on trial, and questions may arise with respect to whether
the protected speech should be allowed into evidence.
In prosecutions for incitement, for example, the government may
seek to introduce clearly protected speech that preceded or followed
the arguably unprotected remarks.8 2 A certain amount of this speech
might conceivably be essential to give content to the allegedly un-
protected speech, to explain precisely what that language is alleged
to mean, and perhaps to establish the elements of constitutionally
unprotected incitement under the test of Brandenburg v. Ohio.
83
More remote speech, however, although perhaps giving further body
to the description of the unprotected incitement, should be strin-
gently tested under the principles suggested here. The jury's focus
on the specific remarks alleged to be unprotected should not be
disturbed by an undue invitation to decide the case on the basis of
the general political views propounded by the defendant. Such an
invitation clearly becomes more prominent as additional evidence of
protected speech is introduced into evidence. The admission of of-
fensive political statements, beyond those clearly necessary to estab-
lish the offense, increases the probability that a jury might convict
for those offensive statements even though it might not believe that
the supposedly unprotected remarks were actually made, or even
though it might not have found that the alleged "incitement" was
actually punishable under a statute drawn to comply with relevant
constitutional tests. The danger of improper jury retaliation is thus
clearly present in this context also.
181. Introduction of that evidence raises no issue under the principles suggested here:
if the speech is found to be unprotected, no problem arises, and if the speech is found
to be protected, the defendant is acquitted.
182. Thus, in a prosecution for incitement by a member of a radical political group,
the prosecution might seek to introduce extensive evidence of the general political views
of the defendant and of the political group in question, in addition to evidence of the
specific language of the defendant alleged to be unprotected and the immediately sur-
rounding circumstances. Cf., e.g., People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829, 281
N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 29 (1968) (views of political group introduced
in prosecution for criminal anarchy). Similarly, in a prosecution for incitement to violent
action immediately following an anti-war rally, the prosecution might seek to introduce
evidence of the speeches delivered at the rally. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446
(1969) (extensive evidence of offensive speech of defendant introduced in addition to specif-
ic remarks apparently thought by prosecution to constitute incitement to unlawful action).
183. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) ("the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
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Conclusion
In the Rosenberg case, as in many other cases in which evidence
of political speech or association has been introduced into evidence,
there was significant danger that antipathy toward the defendants'
political beliefs may have improperly affected the jury's consideration.
The risk of unconstitutional conviction based on protected speech
is always present when unpopular political views of criminal defen-
dants are entered into evidence, but the danger is particularly severe
in times of political tension such as the Cold War era of the 1950s
or the period of social unrest of the late 1960s. Just as litigation arising
in periods of political stress has illuminated First Amendment prob-
lems in many other areas, the history of criminal trials involving
inflammatory political issues reminds us that here, too, the values
of the First Amendment are in need of vigilant protection. It has
been the purpose of this article to suggest some principles by which
First Amendment problems arising in the course of such trials may
be resolved.
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